api: add seccomp adjustment

README.md

@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ The following pieces of container metadata are available to plugins in NRI:
         - cpuset memory
       - Block I/O class
       - RDT class
+    - Linux seccomp profile and policy
   - container (init) process ID
   - container (init process) exit status
   - timestamp of container creation
@@ -252,6 +253,7 @@ container parameters:
         - cpuset memory
       - Block I/O class
       - RDT class
+      - Linux seccomp policy
 
 ### Container Updates
 
@@ -341,11 +343,17 @@ selectively configured to
 1. Reject OCI Hook injection: Reject any adjustment which tries to inject
 OCI Hooks into a container.
 
-2. Verify global mandatory plugins: Verify that all configured mandatory
+2. Reject Linux seccomp policy adjustment: Reject any adjustment which tries
+to set/override Linux seccomp policy of a container. There are separate controls
+for rejecting adjustment of the seccomp policy profile based on the type of policy
+profile set for the container. These types include the runtime default seccomp
+policy profile, a custom policy profile, and unconfined security profiles.
+
+3. Verify global mandatory plugins: Verify that all configured mandatory
 plugins are present and have processed a container. Otherwise reject the
 creation of the container.
 
-3. Verify annotated mandatory plugins: Verify that an annotated set of
+4. Verify annotated mandatory plugins: Verify that an annotated set of
 container-specific mandatory plugins are present and have processed a
 container. Otherwise reject the creation of the container.
 
@@ -354,11 +362,11 @@ allows one to deploy mandatory plugins as containers themselves.
 
 #### Default Validation Scope
 
-Currently only OCI hook injection can be restricted using the default
-validator. However, this probably will change in the future. Especially
-when NRI is extended with control over new container parameters. If such
-parameters will have security implications, corresponding configurable
-restrictions will be introduced to the default validator.
+Currently only OCI hook injection and Linux seccomp policy can be restricted
+using the default validator. However, this probably will change in the future.
+Especially when NRI is extended with control over more container parameters.
+If newly added controls will have security implications, expect corresponding
+configurable restrictions in the default validator.
 
 ## Runtime Adaptation