chore(deps): update dependency vite to v6.1.6 [security] #377
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This PR contains the following updates:
6.0.1->6.1.6GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2025-24010
Summary
Vite allowed any websites to send any requests to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings and lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections.
Warning
This vulnerability even applies to users that only run the Vite dev server on the local machine and does not expose the dev server to the network.
Upgrade Path
Users that does not match either of the following conditions should be able to upgrade to a newer version of Vite that fixes the vulnerability without any additional configuration.
localhostor*.localhostUsing the backend integration feature
If you are using the backend integration feature and not setting
server.origin, you need to add the origin of the backend server to theserver.cors.originoption. Make sure to set a specific origin rather than*, otherwise any origin can access your development server.Using a reverse proxy in front of Vite
If you are using a reverse proxy in front of Vite and sending requests to Vite with a hostname other than
localhostor*.localhost, you need to add the hostname to the newserver.allowedHostsoption. For example, if the reverse proxy is sending requests tohttp://vite:5173, you need to addviteto theserver.allowedHostsoption.Accessing the development server via a domain other than
localhostor*.localhostYou need to add the hostname to the new
server.allowedHostsoption. For example, if you are accessing the development server viahttp://foo.example.com:8080, you need to addfoo.example.comto theserver.allowedHostsoption.Using a plugin / framework that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser
If you are using a plugin / framework, try upgrading to a newer version of Vite that fixes the vulnerability. If the WebSocket connection appears not to be working, the plugin / framework may have a code that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser.
In that case, you can either:
legacy.skipWebSocketTokenCheck: trueto opt-out the fix for [2] while the plugin / framework is incompatible with the new version of ViteMitigation without upgrading Vite
[1]: Permissive default CORS settings
Set
server.corstofalseor limitserver.cors.originto trusted origins.[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections
There aren't any mitigations for this.
[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests
Use Chrome 94+ or use HTTPS for the development server.
Details
There are three causes that allowed malicious websites to send any requests to the development server:
[1]: Permissive default CORS settings
Vite sets the
Access-Control-Allow-Originheader depending onserver.corsoption. The default value wastruewhich setsAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *. This allows websites on any origin tofetchcontents served on the development server.Attack scenario:
http://malicious.example.com).fetch('http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js')request by JS in that malicious web page. This request is normally blocked by same-origin policy, but that's not the case for the reasons above.http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js.[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections
Vite starts a WebSocket server to handle HMR and other functionalities. This WebSocket server did not perform validation on the Origin header and was vulnerable to Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) attacks. With that attack, an attacker can read and write messages on the WebSocket connection. Vite only sends some information over the WebSocket connection (list of the file paths that changed, the file content where the errored happened, etc.), but plugins can send arbitrary messages and may include more sensitive information.
Attack scenario:
http://malicious.example.com).new WebSocket('http://127.0.0.1:5173', 'vite-hmr')by JS in that malicious web page.[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests
Unless
server.httpsis set, Vite starts the development server on HTTP. Non-HTTPS servers are vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks without validation on the Host header. But Vite did not perform validation on the Host header. By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can send arbitrary requests to the development server bypassing the same-origin policy.http://malicious.example.com:5173) (HTTPS won't work).fetch('/main.js')request by JS in that malicious web page.http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.jsbypassing the same origin policy.Impact
[1]: Permissive default CORS settings
Users with the default
server.corsoption may:server.proxymay have those functionalities.[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections
All users may get the file paths of the files that changed and the file content where the error happened be stolen by malicious websites.
For users that is using a plugin that sends messages over WebSocket, that content may be stolen by malicious websites.
For users that is using a plugin that has a functionality that is triggered by messages over WebSocket, that functionality may be exploited by malicious websites.
[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests
Users using HTTP for the development server and using a browser that is not Chrome 94+ may:
server.proxymay have those functionalities.Chrome 94+ users are not affected for [3], because sending a request to a private network page from public non-HTTPS page is forbidden since Chrome 94.
Related Information
Safari has a bug that blocks requests to loopback addresses from HTTPS origins. This means when the user is using Safari and Vite is listening on lookback addresses, there's another condition of "the malicious web page is served on HTTP" to make [1] and [2] to work.
PoC
[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections
reacttemplate which utilizes HMR functionality.http://localhost:5173/) as well as the malicious page in the browser.src/App.jsxfile and intentionally place a syntax errorHere's a video demonstrating the POC:
vite-cswsh.mov
CVE-2025-30208
Summary
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
Impact
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using
--hostorserver.hostconfig option) are affected.Details
@fsdenies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding?raw??or?import&raw??to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists. This bypass exists because trailing separators such as?are removed in several places, but are not accounted for in query string regexes.PoC
CVE-2025-31125
Summary
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
Impact
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using
--hostorserver.hostconfig option) are affected.Details
?inline&import(originally reported as?import&?inline=1.wasm?init)?raw?import/@​fs/isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root.PoC
Original report (check details above for simplified cases):
The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice
Example full URL
http://localhost:5173/@​fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?initCVE-2025-31486
Summary
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
Impact
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Details
.svgRequests ending with
.svgare loaded at this line.https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/037f801075ec35bb6e52145d659f71a23813c48f/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts#L285-L290
By adding
?.svgwith?.wasm?initor withsec-fetch-dest: scriptheader, the restriction was able to bypass.This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than
build.assetsInlineLimit(default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+.relative paths
The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g.
../../).PoC
npm create vite@latest cd vite-project/ npm install npm run devsend request to read
etc/passwdcurl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/etc/passwd?.svg?.wasm?init'curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/@​fs/x/x/x/vite-project/?/../../../../../etc/passwd?import&?raw'CVE-2025-32395
Summary
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser if the dev server is running on Node or Bun.
Impact
Only apps with the following conditions are affected.
Details
HTTP 1.1 spec (RFC 9112) does not allow
#inrequest-target. Although an attacker can send such a request. For those requests with an invalidrequest-line(it includesrequest-target), the spec recommends to reject them with 400 or 301. The same can be said for HTTP 2 (ref1, ref2, ref3).On Node and Bun, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land. For those requests, the value of
http.IncomingMessage.urlcontains#. Vite assumedreq.urlwon't contain#when checkingserver.fs.deny, allowing those kinds of requests to bypass the check.On Deno, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land as well. But for those requests, the value of
http.IncomingMessage.urldid not contain#.PoC
send request to read
/etc/passwdCVE-2025-46565
Summary
The contents of files in the project
rootthat are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.Impact
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Only files that are under project
rootand are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed..env,.env.*,*.{crt,pem},**/.env**/.git/**,.git/**,.git/**/*Details
server.fs.denycan contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes.env,.env.*,*.{crt,pem}as such patterns).These patterns were able to bypass for files under
rootby using a combination of slash and dot (/.).PoC
Release Notes
vitejs/vite (vite)
v6.1.6Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
v6.1.5Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
v6.1.4Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
v6.1.3Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
v6.1.2Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
v6.1.1Compare Source
.[cm]?[tj]sx?static assets are JS mime (#19453) (e7ba55e), closes #19453*.ipv4address in cert (#19416) (973283b), closes #19416v6.1.0Compare Source
Features
portin the logged error message after failed WS connection withEADDRINUSE(#19212) (14027b0), closes #19212.jxl(#18855) (57b397c), closes #18855builtinsenvironmentresolve(#18584) (2c2d521), closes #18584defaultAllowedOriginsfor user-land config and 3rd party plugins (#19259) (dc8946b), closes #19259wasmto the compressible assets regex (#19085) (ce84142), closes #19085Fixes
resolveLibCssFilename(#19324) (f183bdf), closes #19324vite optimize(#19347) (19ffad0), closes #19347server.preTransformRequests(#19272) (12aaa58), closes #19272nodeLikeBuiltinsforssr.target: 'webworker'withoutnoExternal: true(#19313) (9fc31b6), closes #19313@pluginimports of JS files treated as CSS and rebased (fix #19268) (#19269) (602b373), closes #19268 #19269resolve.builtinis empty (#19312) (b7aba0b), closes #19312ssrLoadModule(#19290) (353c467), closes #19290--forcework for all environments (#18901) (51a42c6), closes #18901RegExpvalues withnew RegExpinstead ofstructuredClone(fix #19245, fix #1 (56ad2be), closes #19245 #18875 #19247Chore
vite optimizecommand (#19348) (6e0e3c0), closes #19348build.manifestjsdocs (#19332) (4583781), closes #19332scanImportsnot being used in ssr (#19285) (fbbc6da), closes #19285Beta Changelogs
6.1.0-beta.2 (2025-02-04)
See 6.1.0-beta.2 changelog
6.1.0-beta.1 (2025-02-04)
See 6.1.0-beta.1 changelog
6.1.0-beta.0 (2025-01-24)
See 6.1.0-beta.0 changelog
v6.0.15Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
v6.0.14Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
v6.0.13Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
v6.0.12Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
v6.0.11Compare Source
preview.allowedHostswith specific values was not respected (#19246) (aeb3ec8), closes #19246v6.0.10Compare Source
server.originURL (#19241) (2495022), closes #19241v6.0.9Compare Source
server.allowedHosts(bd896fb)server.cors: falseto disallow fetching from untrusted origins (b09572a)v6.0.8Compare Source
server.close()only called once (#19204) (db81c2d), closes #19204defaultServerConditions(#19174) (ad75c56), closes #19174ESBuildOptions.include / excludetype to allowreadonly (string | RegExp)[](ea53e70), closes #19146v6.0.7Compare Source
minifywhenbuilder.sharedPlugins: true(#19025) (f7b1964), closes #19025vite-ignoreattribute for inline script (#19062) (a492253), closes #19062v6.0.6Compare Source
fetchModule-side resolve (#18361) (9f10261), closes #18361build.target(#19047) (0e9e81f), closes #19047v6.0.5Compare Source
v6.0.4Compare Source
this.resolveskipSelf should not skip for differentidorimport(#18903) (4727320), closes #18903pluginContainer.getModuleInfo(#18895) (258cdd6), closes #18895url()when lightningcss is used (#18997) (3734f80), closes #18997true(#18899) (8a6bb4e), closes #18899handleInvoke(#18902) (27f691b), closes #18902ModuleRunnerTransportinvokeAPI (#18865) (e5f5301), closes #18865v6.0.3Compare Source
ModuleRunnerTransport#invokemore explicit (#18851) (a75fc31), closes #18851environments.ssr.resolvewith rootssrconfig (#18857) (3104331), closes #18857Configuration
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