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Update dependency vllm to v0.8.5 [SECURITY] - autoclosed #28
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Signed-off-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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This PR contains the following updates:
==v0.6.6->==0.8.5==v0.6.4->==0.8.5==0.6.6->==0.8.5==0.6.4->==0.8.5vllm: Malicious model to RCE by torch.load in hf_model_weights_iterator
CVE-2025-24357 / GHSA-rh4j-5rhw-hr54
More information
Details
Description
The vllm/model_executor/weight_utils.py implements hf_model_weights_iterator to load the model checkpoint, which is downloaded from huggingface. It use torch.load function and weights_only parameter is default value False. There is a security warning on https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/generated/torch.load.html, when torch.load load a malicious pickle data it will execute arbitrary code during unpickling.
Impact
This vulnerability can be exploited to execute arbitrary codes and OS commands in the victim machine who fetch the pretrained repo remotely.
Note that most models now use the safetensors format, which is not vulnerable to this issue.
References
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
vLLM uses Python 3.12 built-in hash() which leads to predictable hash collisions in prefix cache
CVE-2025-25183 / GHSA-rm76-4mrf-v9r8
More information
Details
Summary
Maliciously constructed prompts can lead to hash collisions, resulting in prefix cache reuse, which can interfere with subsequent responses and cause unintended behavior.
Details
vLLM's prefix caching makes use of Python's built-in hash() function. As of Python 3.12, the behavior of hash(None) has changed to be a predictable constant value. This makes it more feasible that someone could try exploit hash collisions.
Impact
The impact of a collision would be using cache that was generated using different content. Given knowledge of prompts in use and predictable hashing behavior, someone could intentionally populate the cache using a prompt known to collide with another prompt in use.
Solution
We address this problem by initializing hashes in vllm with a value that is no longer constant and predictable. It will be different each time vllm runs. This restores behavior we got in Python versions prior to 3.12.
Using a hashing algorithm that is less prone to collision (like sha256, for example) would be the best way to avoid the possibility of a collision. However, it would have an impact to both performance and memory footprint. Hash collisions may still occur, though they are no longer straight forward to predict.
To give an idea of the likelihood of a collision, for randomly generated hash values (assuming the hash generation built into Python is uniformly distributed), with a cache capacity of 50,000 messages and an average prompt length of 300, a collision will occur on average once every 1 trillion requests.
References
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
CVE-2025-24357 Malicious model remote code execution fix bypass with PyTorch < 2.6.0
GHSA-ggpf-24jw-3fcw
More information
Details
Description
GHSA-rh4j-5rhw-hr54 reported a vulnerability where loading a malicious model could result in code execution on the vllm host. The fix applied to specify
weights_only=Trueto calls totorch.load()did not solve the problem prior to PyTorch 2.6.0.PyTorch has issued a new CVE about this problem: GHSA-53q9-r3pm-6pq6
This means that versions of vLLM using PyTorch before 2.6.0 are vulnerable to this problem.
Background Knowledge
When users install VLLM according to the official manual

But the version of PyTorch is specified in the requirements. txt file

So by default when the user install VLLM, it will install the PyTorch with version 2.5.1

In CVE-2025-24357, weights_only=True was used for patching, but we know this is not secure.
Because we found that using Weights_only=True in pyTorch before 2.5.1 was unsafe
Here, we use this interface to prove that it is not safe.

Fix
update PyTorch version to 2.6.0
Credit
This vulnerability was found By Ji'an Zhou and Li'shuo Song
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
vLLM denial of service via outlines unbounded cache on disk
CVE-2025-29770 / GHSA-mgrm-fgjv-mhv8
More information
Details
Impact
The outlines library is one of the backends used by vLLM to support structured output (a.k.a. guided decoding). Outlines provides an optional cache for its compiled grammars on the local filesystem. This cache has been on by default in vLLM. Outlines is also available by default through the OpenAI compatible API server.
The affected code in vLLM is vllm/model_executor/guided_decoding/outlines_logits_processors.py, which unconditionally uses the cache from outlines. vLLM should have this off by default and allow administrators to opt-in due to the potential for abuse.
A malicious user can send a stream of very short decoding requests with unique schemas, resulting in an addition to the cache for each request. This can result in a Denial of Service if the filesystem runs out of space.
Note that even if vLLM was configured to use a different backend by default, it is still possible to choose outlines on a per-request basis using the
guided_decoding_backendkey of theextra_bodyfield of the request.This issue applies to the V0 engine only. The V1 engine is not affected.
Patches
The fix is to disable this cache by default since it does not provide an option to limit its size. If you want to use this cache anyway, you may set the
VLLM_V0_USE_OUTLINES_CACHEenvironment variable to1.Workarounds
There is no way to workaround this issue in existing versions of vLLM other than preventing untrusted access to the OpenAI compatible API server.
References
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
vLLM Allows Remote Code Execution via Mooncake Integration
CVE-2025-29783 / GHSA-x3m8-f7g5-qhm7
More information
Details
Summary
When vLLM is configured to use Mooncake, unsafe deserialization exposed directly over ZMQ/TCP will allow attackers to execute remote code on distributed hosts.
Details
Further, the mooncake integration opens these sockets listening on all interfaces on the host, meaning it can not be configured to only use a private, trusted network.Only
sender_socketandreceiver_ackare allowed to be accessed publicly, while the data actually decompressed bypickle.loads()comes from recv_bytes. Its interface is defined asself.receiver_socket.connect(f\"tcp://{d_host}:{d_rank_offset + 1}\"), whered_hostisdecode_host, a locally defined address 192.168.0.139,from mooncake.json (https://github.com/kvcache-ai/Mooncake/blob/main/doc/en/vllm-integration-v0.2.md?plain=1#L36).recv_tensor()calls_recv_implwhich passes the raw network bytes topickle.loads(). Additionally, it does not appear that there are any controls (network, authentication, etc) to prevent arbitrary users from sending this payload to the affected service.Impact
This is a remote code execution vulnerability impacting any deployments using Mooncake to distribute KV across distributed hosts.
Remediation
This issue is resolved by https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/14228
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
vLLM deserialization vulnerability in vllm.distributed.GroupCoordinator.recv_object
CVE-2024-9052 / GHSA-pgr7-mhp5-fgjp
More information
Details
vllm-project vllm version 0.6.0 contains a vulnerability in the distributed training API. The function vllm.distributed.GroupCoordinator.recv_object() deserializes received object bytes using pickle.loads() without sanitization, leading to a remote code execution vulnerability.
Maintainer perspective
Note that vLLM does NOT use the code as described in the report on huntr. The problem only exists if you use these internal APIs in a way that exposes them to a network as described. The vllm team was not involved in the analysis of this report and the decision to assign it a CVE.
Severity
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
vLLM vulnerable to Denial of Service by abusing xgrammar cache
GHSA-hf3c-wxg2-49q9
More information
Details
Impact
This report is to highlight a vulnerability in XGrammar, a library used by the structured output feature in vLLM. The XGrammar advisory is here: GHSA-389x-67px-mjg3
The xgrammar library is the default backend used by vLLM to support structured output (a.k.a. guided decoding). Xgrammar provides a required, built-in cache for its compiled grammars stored in RAM. xgrammar is available by default through the OpenAI compatible API server with both the V0 and V1 engines.
A malicious user can send a stream of very short decoding requests with unique schemas, resulting in an addition to the cache for each request. This can result in a Denial of Service by consuming all of the system's RAM.
Note that even if vLLM was configured to use a different backend by default, it is still possible to choose xgrammar on a per-request basis using the
guided_decoding_backendkey of theextra_bodyfield of the request with the V0 engine. This per-request choice is not available when using the V1 engine.Patches
Workarounds
There is no way to workaround this issue in existing versions of vLLM other than preventing untrusted access to the OpenAI compatible API server.
References
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Data exposure via ZeroMQ on multi-node vLLM deployment
CVE-2025-30202 / GHSA-9f8f-2vmf-885j
More information
Details
Impact
In a multi-node vLLM deployment, vLLM uses ZeroMQ for some multi-node communication purposes. The primary vLLM host opens an
XPUBZeroMQ socket and binds it to ALL interfaces. While the socket is always opened for a multi-node deployment, it is only used when doing tensor parallelism across multiple hosts.Any client with network access to this host can connect to this
XPUBsocket unless its port is blocked by a firewall. Once connected, these arbitrary clients will receive all of the same data broadcasted to all of the secondary vLLM hosts. This data is internal vLLM state information that is not useful to an attacker.By potentially connecting to this socket many times and not reading data published to them, an attacker can also cause a denial of service by slowing down or potentially blocking the publisher.
Detailed Analysis
The
XPUBsocket in question is created here:https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/c21b99b91241409c2fdf9f3f8c542e8748b317be/vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_broadcast.py#L236-L237
Data is published over this socket via
MessageQueue.enqueue()which is called byMessageQueue.broadcast_object():https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_broadcast.py#L452-L453
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_broadcast.py#L475-L478
The
MessageQueue.broadcast_object()method is called by theGroupCoordinator.broadcast_object()method inparallel_state.py:https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/distributed/parallel_state.py#L364-L366
The broadcast over ZeroMQ is only done if the
GroupCoordinatorwas created withuse_message_queue_broadcasterset toTrue:https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/distributed/parallel_state.py#L216-L219
The only case where
GroupCoordinatoris created withuse_message_queue_broadcasteris the coordinator for the tensor parallelism group:https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/distributed/parallel_state.py#L931-L936
To determine what data is broadcasted to the tensor parallism group, we must continue tracing.
GroupCoordinator.broadcast_object()is called byGroupCoordinator.broadcoast_tensor_dict():https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/distributed/parallel_state.py#L489
which is called by
broadcast_tensor_dict()incommunication_op.py:https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/distributed/communication_op.py#L29-L34
If we look at
_get_driver_input_and_broadcast()in the V0worker_base.py, we'll see how this tensor dict is formed:https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/790b79750b596043036b9fcbee885827fdd2ef3d/vllm/worker/worker_base.py#L332-L352
but the data actually sent over ZeroMQ is the
metadata_listportion that is split from thistensor_dict. The tensor parts are sent viatorch.distributedand only metadata about those tensors is sent via ZeroMQ.https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/54a66e5fee4a1ea62f1e4c79a078b20668e408c6/vllm/distributed/parallel_state.py#L61-L83
Patches
No fix yet.
Workarounds
Prior to the fix, your options include:
XPUBsocket. Note that port used is random.References
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
vLLM Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Mooncake Integration
CVE-2025-32444 / GHSA-hj4w-hm2g-p6w5
More information
Details
Impacted Deployments
Note that vLLM instances that do NOT make use of the mooncake integration are NOT vulnerable.
Description
vLLM integration with mooncake is vaulnerable to remote code execution due to using
picklebased serialization over unsecured ZeroMQ sockets. The vulnerable sockets were set to listen on all network interfaces, increasing the likelihood that an attacker is able to reach the vulnerable ZeroMQ sockets to carry out an attack.This is a similar to GHSA - x3m8 - f7g5 - qhm7, the problem is in
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/32b14baf8a1f7195ca09484de3008063569b43c5/vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_pipe/mooncake_pipe.py#L179
Here recv_pyobj() Contains implicit
pickle.loads(), which leads to potential RCE.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
vllm-project/vllm (vllm)
v0.8.5Compare Source
This release contains 310 commits from 143 contributors (55 new contributors!).
Highlights
This release features important multi-modal bug fixes, day 0 support for Qwen3, and xgrammar's structure tag feature for tool calling.
Model Support
V1 Engine
structural_tagsupport using xgrammar (#17085)Features
v1/audio/transcriptionsendpoint (#16591)vllm bench [latency, throughput]CLI commands (#16508)Performance
Hardwares
Documentation
Security and Dependency Updates
Build and testing
Breaking changes 🚨
--enable-chunked-prefill,--multi-step-stream-outputs,--disable-chunked-mm-inputcan no longer explicitly be set toFalse. Instead, addno-to the start of the argument (i.e.--enable-chunked-prefilland--no-enable-chunked-prefill) (https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16533)What's Changed
SchedulerConfigby @hmellor in https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16533max-num-batched-tokensis not a power of 2 by @NickLucche in https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16596pyzmqversion by @taneem-ibrahim in https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16549vllm bench [latency, throughput]CLI commands by @mgoin in https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16508compressed-tensorsWNA16 to support zero-points by @dsikka in https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/14211backend_xgrammar.pyby @shen-shanshan in https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16578additional_dependencies: [toml]for pre-commit yapf hook by @yankay in https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16405TokenizerPoolConfig+DeviceConfigby @hmellor in https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16603max-num-batched-tokensis not even by @NickLucche in https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16726--compilation-configby @DarkLight1337 in https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16729_validate_structured_output()by @shen-shanshan in https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16748MultiModalConfig+PoolerConfig+DecodingConfigby @hmellor in https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16789nullable_kvsfallback by @hmellor in https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16837Configuration
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