PCI: loongson: Fix supported link speeds for Loongson 3c19/3c29 PCIe devices proper dynamic speed negotiation. #2

AydenMeng · 2025-06-04T03:45:59Z

The "Supported Link Speeds" field reported by Loongson PCIe devices 3c19 and 3c29 is incorrect, which prevents the AMDGPU driver (and potentially others) from correctly detecting the dynamic link speed capabilities of the device. As a result, the PCIe card is incorrectly identified as a GEN1-only device, even when higher speeds are supported.

This patch manually overrides the supported_speeds field for these devices to reflect the actual supported link speeds.

Tested-by: Lain "Fearyncess" Yang [email protected]

series steppings Older steppings of the Loongson 3C6000 series incorrectly report the supported link speeds on their PCIe bridges (device IDs 3c19, 3c29) as only 2.5 GT/s, despite the upstream bus supporting speeds from 2.5 GT/s up to 16 GT/s. As a result, certain PCIe devices would be incorrectly probed as a Gen1- only, even if higher link speeds are supported, harming performance and prevents dynamic link speed functionality from being enabled in drivers such as amdgpu. Manually override the `supported_speeds` field for affected PCIe bridges with those found on the upstream bus to correctly reflect the supported link speeds. Tested-by: Lain "Fearyncess" Yang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]>

Add a compile-time check that `*$ptr` is of the type of `$type->$($f)*`. Rename those placeholders for clarity. Given the incorrect usage: > diff --git a/rust/kernel/rbtree.rs b/rust/kernel/rbtree.rs > index 8d978c8..6a7089149878 100644 > --- a/rust/kernel/rbtree.rs > +++ b/rust/kernel/rbtree.rs > @@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ fn raw_entry(&mut self, key: &K) -> RawEntry<'_, K, V> { > while !(*child_field_of_parent).is_null() { > let curr = *child_field_of_parent; > // SAFETY: All links fields we create are in a `Node<K, V>`. > - let node = unsafe { container_of!(curr, Node<K, V>, links) }; > + let node = unsafe { container_of!(curr, Node<K, V>, key) }; > > // SAFETY: `node` is a non-null node so it is valid by the type invariants. > match key.cmp(unsafe { &(*node).key }) { this patch produces the compilation error: > error[E0308]: mismatched types > --> rust/kernel/lib.rs:220:45 > | > 220 | $crate::assert_same_type(field_ptr, (&raw const (*container_ptr).$($fields)*).cast_mut()); > | ------------------------ --------- ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ expected `*mut rb_node`, found `*mut K` > | | | > | | expected all arguments to be this `*mut bindings::rb_node` type because they need to match the type of this parameter > | arguments to this function are incorrect > | > ::: rust/kernel/rbtree.rs:270:6 > | > 270 | impl<K, V> RBTree<K, V> > | - found this type parameter > ... > 332 | let node = unsafe { container_of!(curr, Node<K, V>, key) }; > | ------------------------------------ in this macro invocation > | > = note: expected raw pointer `*mut bindings::rb_node` > found raw pointer `*mut K` > note: function defined here > --> rust/kernel/lib.rs:227:8 > | > 227 | pub fn assert_same_type<T>(_: T, _: T) {} > | ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ - ---- ---- this parameter needs to match the `*mut bindings::rb_node` type of parameter #1 > | | | > | | parameter #2 needs to match the `*mut bindings::rb_node` type of this parameter > | parameter #1 and parameter #2 both reference this parameter `T` > = note: this error originates in the macro `container_of` (in Nightly builds, run with -Z macro-backtrace for more info) [ We decided to go with a variation of v1 [1] that became v4, since it seems like the obvious approach, the error messages seem good enough and the debug performance should be fine, given the kernel is always built with -O2. In the future, we may want to make the helper non-hidden, with proper documentation, for others to use. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/rust-for-linux/CANiq72kQWNfSV0KK6qs6oJt+aGdgY=hXg=wJcmK3zYcokY1LNw@mail.gmail.com/ - Miguel ] Suggested-by: Alice Ryhl <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAH5fLgh6gmqGBhPMi2SKn7mCmMWfOSiS0WP5wBuGPYh9ZTAiww@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Benno Lossin <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] [ Added intra-doc link. - Miguel ] Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <[email protected]>

Batch #2 of next window Signed-off-by: Nishanth Menon <[email protected]>

Some architectures (e.g. arm64) only support memory hotplug operations on a restricted set of physical addresses. This applies even when we are faking some CXL fixed memory windows for the purposes of cxl_test. That range can be queried with mhp_get_pluggable_range(true). Use the minimum of that the top of that range and iomem_resource.end to establish the 64GiB region used by cxl_test. From thread #2 which was related to the issue in #1. [ dj: Add CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG config check, from Alison ] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/[email protected]/ #2 Reported-by: Itaru Kitayama <[email protected]> Closes: pmem/ndctl#278 #1 Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Tested-by: Itaru Kitayama <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> Tested-by: Marc Herbert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>

pert script tests fails with segmentation fault as below: 92: perf script tests: --- start --- test child forked, pid 103769 DB test [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.012 MB /tmp/perf-test-script.7rbftEpOzX/perf.data (9 samples) ] /usr/libexec/perf-core/tests/shell/script.sh: line 35: 103780 Segmentation fault (core dumped) perf script -i "${perfdatafile}" -s "${db_test}" --- Cleaning up --- ---- end(-1) ---- 92: perf script tests : FAILED! Backtrace pointed to : #0 0x0000000010247dd0 in maps.machine () #1 0x00000000101d178c in db_export.sample () #2 0x00000000103412c8 in python_process_event () #3 0x000000001004eb28 in process_sample_event () #4 0x000000001024fcd0 in machines.deliver_event () #5 0x000000001025005c in perf_session.deliver_event () #6 0x00000000102568b0 in __ordered_events__flush.part.0 () #7 0x0000000010251618 in perf_session.process_events () #8 0x0000000010053620 in cmd_script () #9 0x00000000100b5a28 in run_builtin () #10 0x00000000100b5f94 in handle_internal_command () #11 0x0000000010011114 in main () Further investigation reveals that this occurs in the `perf script tests`, because it uses `db_test.py` script. This script sets `perf_db_export_mode = True`. With `perf_db_export_mode` enabled, if a sample originates from a hypervisor, perf doesn't set maps for "[H]" sample in the code. Consequently, `al->maps` remains NULL when `maps__machine(al->maps)` is called from `db_export__sample`. As al->maps can be NULL in case of Hypervisor samples , use thread->maps because even for Hypervisor sample, machine should exist. If we don't have machine for some reason, return -1 to avoid segmentation fault. Reported-by: Disha Goel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Aditya Bodkhe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Tested-by: Disha Goel <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Suggested-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>

Some architectures (e.g. arm64) only support memory hotplug operations on a restricted set of physical addresses. This applies even when we are faking some CXL fixed memory windows for the purposes of cxl_test. That range can be queried with mhp_get_pluggable_range(true). Use the minimum of that the top of that range and iomem_resource.end to establish the 64GiB region used by cxl_test. From thread #2 which was related to the issue in #1. [ dj: Add CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG config check, from Alison ] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/[email protected]/ #2 Reported-by: Itaru Kitayama <[email protected]> Closes: pmem/ndctl#278 #1 Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Tested-by: Itaru Kitayama <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> Tested-by: Marc Herbert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ee684de ] As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Reported-by: lmarch2 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <[email protected]> Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit c98cc97 upstream. Running a modified trace-cmd record --nosplice where it does a mmap of the ring buffer when '--nosplice' is set, caused the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f torvalds#551 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ trace-cmd/1113 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888100062888 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 but task is already holding lock: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #5 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #4 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}: __might_fault+0xa5/0x110 _copy_to_user+0x22/0x80 _perf_ioctl+0x61b/0x1b70 perf_ioctl+0x62/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x134/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #3 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 perf_event_init_cpu+0x325/0x7c0 perf_event_init+0x52a/0x5b0 start_kernel+0x263/0x3e0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0x95/0xa0 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #2 (pmus_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 perf_event_init_cpu+0xb7/0x7c0 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x2c0/0x1030 __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0xbf/0x1f0 _cpu_up+0x2e7/0x690 cpu_up+0x117/0x170 cpuhp_bringup_mask+0xd5/0x120 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x13d/0x170 smp_init+0x2b/0xf0 kernel_init_freeable+0x441/0x6d0 kernel_init+0x1e/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xd0 ring_buffer_resize+0x610/0x14e0 __tracing_resize_ring_buffer.part.0+0x42/0x120 tracing_set_tracer+0x7bd/0xa80 tracing_set_trace_write+0x132/0x1e0 vfs_write+0x21c/0xe80 ksys_write+0xf9/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210 lock_acquire+0x174/0x310 __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &buffer->mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &cpu_buffer->mapping_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock); lock(&mm->mmap_lock); lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock); lock(&buffer->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by trace-cmd/1113: #0: ffff888106b847e0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: vm_mmap_pgoff+0x192/0x390 #1: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 stack backtrace: CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1113 Comm: trace-cmd Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f torvalds#551 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1be check_noncircular+0x146/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210 lock_acquire+0x174/0x310 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? __mutex_lock+0x169/0x18c0 __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? function_trace_call+0x296/0x370 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_function_trace_call+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? __mutex_lock+0x5/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12d/0x270 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? trace_preempt_on+0xd0/0x110 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0 ? __pfx___mmap_region+0x10/0x10 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10 ? bpf_lsm_mmap_addr+0x4/0x10 ? security_mmap_addr+0x46/0xd0 ? lock_is_held_type+0xd9/0x130 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 ? 0xffffffffc0370095 ? __pfx_do_mmap+0x10/0x10 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ? __pfx_vm_mmap_pgoff+0x10/0x10 ? 0xffffffffc0370095 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fb0963a7de2 Code: 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 27 55 89 cd 53 48 89 fb 48 85 ff 74 3b 41 89 ea 48 89 df b8 09 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 76 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 00 48 8b 05 e1 9f 0d 00 64 RSP: 002b:00007ffdcc8fb878 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000009 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fb0963a7de2 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffdcc8fbe68 R14: 00007fb096628000 R15: 00005633e01a5c90 </TASK> The issue is that cpus_read_lock() is taken within buffer->mutex. The memory mapped pages are taken with the mmap_lock held. The buffer->mutex is taken within the cpu_buffer->mapping_lock. There's quite a chain with all these locks, where the deadlock can be fixed by moving the cpus_read_lock() outside the taking of the buffer->mutex. Cc: [email protected] Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]> Cc: Vincent Donnefort <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Fixes: 117c392 ("ring-buffer: Introducing ring-buffer mapping functions") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.16, take #2 - Rework of system register accessors for system registers that are directly writen to memory, so that sanitisation of the in-memory value happens at the correct time (after the read, or before the write). For convenience, RMW-style accessors are also provided. - Multiple fixes for the so-called "arch-timer-edge-cases' selftest, which was always broken.

As-per the SBI specification, an SBI remote fence operation applies to the entire address space if either: 1) start_addr and size are both 0 2) size is equal to 2^XLEN-1 >From the above, only #1 is checked by SBI SFENCE calls so fix the size parameter check in SBI SFENCE calls to cover #2 as well. Fixes: 13acfec ("RISC-V: KVM: Add remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests") Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]>

This patch fixes an issue seen in a large-scale deployment under heavy incoming pkts where the aRFS flow wrongly matches a flow and reprograms the NIC with wrong settings. That mis-steering causes RX-path latency spikes and noisy neighbor effects when many connections collide on the same hash (some of our production servers have 20-30K connections). set_rps_cpu() calls ndo_rx_flow_steer() with flow_id that is calculated by hashing the skb sized by the per rx-queue table size. This results in multiple connections (even across different rx-queues) getting the same hash value. The driver steer function modifies the wrong flow to use this rx-queue, e.g.: Flow#1 is first added: Flow#1: <ip1, port1, ip2, port2>, Hash 'h', q#10 Later when a new flow needs to be added: Flow#2: <ip3, port3, ip4, port4>, Hash 'h', q#20 The driver finds the hash 'h' from Flow#1 and updates it to use q#20. This results in both flows getting un-optimized - packets for Flow#1 goes to q#20, and then reprogrammed back to q#10 later and so on; and Flow #2 programming is never done as Flow#1 is matched first for all misses. Many flows may wrongly share the same hash and reprogram rules of the original flow each with their own q#. Tested on two 144-core servers with 16K netperf sessions for 180s. Netperf clients are pinned to cores 0-71 sequentially (so that wrong packets on q#s 72-143 can be measured). IRQs are set 1:1 for queues -> CPUs, enable XPS, enable aRFS (global value is 144 * rps_flow_cnt). Test notes about results from ice_rx_flow_steer(): --------------------------------------------------- 1. "Skip:" counter increments here: if (fltr_info->q_index == rxq_idx || arfs_entry->fltr_state != ICE_ARFS_ACTIVE) goto out; 2. "Add:" counter increments here: ret = arfs_entry->fltr_info.fltr_id; INIT_HLIST_NODE(&arfs_entry->list_entry); 3. "Update:" counter increments here: /* update the queue to forward to on an already existing flow */ Runtime comparison: original code vs with the patch for different rps_flow_cnt values. +-------------------------------+--------------+--------------+ | rps_flow_cnt | 512 | 2048 | +-------------------------------+--------------+--------------+ | Ratio of Pkts on Good:Bad q's | 214 vs 822K | 1.1M vs 980K | | Avoid wrong aRFS programming | 0 vs 310K | 0 vs 30K | | CPU User | 216 vs 183 | 216 vs 206 | | CPU System | 1441 vs 1171 | 1447 vs 1320 | | CPU Softirq | 1245 vs 920 | 1238 vs 961 | | CPU Total | 29 vs 22.7 | 29 vs 24.9 | | aRFS Update | 533K vs 59 | 521K vs 32 | | aRFS Skip | 82M vs 77M | 7.2M vs 4.5M | +-------------------------------+--------------+--------------+ A separate TCP_STREAM and TCP_RR with 1,4,8,16,64,128,256,512 connections showed no performance degradation. Some points on the patch/aRFS behavior: 1. Enabling full tuple matching ensures flows are always correctly matched, even with smaller hash sizes. 2. 5-6% drop in CPU utilization as the packets arrive at the correct CPUs and fewer calls to driver for programming on misses. 3. Larger hash tables reduces mis-steering due to more unique flow hashes, but still has clashes. However, with larger per-device rps_flow_cnt, old flows take more time to expire and new aRFS flows cannot be added if h/w limits are reached (rps_may_expire_flow() succeeds when 10*rps_flow_cnt pkts have been processed by this cpu that are not part of the flow). Fixes: 28bf267 ("ice: Implement aRFS") Signed-off-by: Krishna Kumar <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Rinitha S <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>

syzkaller reported a null-ptr-deref in sock_omalloc() while allocating a CALIPSO option. [0] The NULL is of struct sock, which was fetched by sk_to_full_sk() in calipso_req_setattr(). Since commit a1a5344 ("tcp: avoid two atomic ops for syncookies"), reqsk->rsk_listener could be NULL when SYN Cookie is returned to its client, as hinted by the leading SYN Cookie log. Here are 3 options to fix the bug: 1) Return 0 in calipso_req_setattr() 2) Return an error in calipso_req_setattr() 3) Alaways set rsk_listener 1) is no go as it bypasses LSM, but 2) effectively disables SYN Cookie for CALIPSO. 3) is also no go as there have been many efforts to reduce atomic ops and make TCP robust against DDoS. See also commit 3b24d85 ("tcp/dccp: do not touch listener sk_refcnt under synflood"). As of the blamed commit, SYN Cookie already did not need refcounting, and no one has stumbled on the bug for 9 years, so no CALIPSO user will care about SYN Cookie. Let's return an error in calipso_req_setattr() and calipso_req_delattr() in the SYN Cookie case. This can be reproduced by [1] on Fedora and now connect() of nc times out. [0]: TCP: request_sock_TCPv6: Possible SYN flooding on port [::]:20002. Sending cookies. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 12262 Comm: syz.1.2611 Not tainted 6.14.0 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:406 [inline] RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:655 [inline] RIP: 0010:sock_kmalloc+0x35/0x170 net/core/sock.c:2806 Code: 89 d5 41 54 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb e8 25 e3 c6 fd e8 f0 91 e3 00 48 8d 7b 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 26 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b RSP: 0018:ffff88811af89038 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff888105266400 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff88800c890000 RDI: 0000000000000030 RBP: 0000000000000050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810526640e R10: ffffed1020a4cc81 R11: ffff88810526640f R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000820 R14: ffff888105266400 R15: 0000000000000050 FS: 00007f0653a07640(0000) GS:ffff88811af80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f863ba096f4 CR3: 00000000163c0005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 80000000 Call Trace: <IRQ> ipv6_renew_options+0x279/0x950 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1288 calipso_req_setattr+0x181/0x340 net/ipv6/calipso.c:1204 calipso_req_setattr+0x56/0x80 net/netlabel/netlabel_calipso.c:597 netlbl_req_setattr+0x18a/0x440 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1249 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request+0x1fb/0x320 security/selinux/netlabel.c:342 selinux_inet_conn_request+0x1eb/0x2c0 security/selinux/hooks.c:5551 security_inet_conn_request+0x50/0xa0 security/security.c:4945 tcp_v6_route_req+0x22c/0x550 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:825 tcp_conn_request+0xec8/0x2b70 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:7275 tcp_v6_conn_request+0x1e3/0x440 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1328 tcp_rcv_state_process+0xafa/0x52b0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6781 tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x8a6/0x1a40 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1667 tcp_v6_rcv+0x505e/0x5b50 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1904 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x17c/0x1da0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:436 ip6_input_finish+0x103/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:480 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline] ip6_input+0x13c/0x6b0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:491 dst_input include/net/dst.h:469 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish+0xb6/0x490 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0xf9/0x490 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:309 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x12e/0x1f0 net/core/dev.c:5896 __netif_receive_skb+0x1d/0x170 net/core/dev.c:6009 process_backlog+0x41e/0x13b0 net/core/dev.c:6357 __napi_poll+0xbd/0x710 net/core/dev.c:7191 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:7260 [inline] net_rx_action+0x9de/0xde0 net/core/dev.c:7382 handle_softirqs+0x19a/0x770 kernel/softirq.c:561 do_softirq.part.0+0x36/0x70 kernel/softirq.c:462 </IRQ> <TASK> do_softirq arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:26 [inline] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xf1/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:389 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline] rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:919 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0xc2a/0x3c40 net/core/dev.c:4679 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3313 [inline] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:523 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:537 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0xd69/0x1f80 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:141 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:215 [inline] ip6_finish_output+0x5dc/0xd60 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:226 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] ip6_output+0x24b/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247 dst_output include/net/dst.h:459 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline] ip6_xmit+0xbbc/0x20d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:366 inet6_csk_xmit+0x39a/0x720 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:135 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1a7b/0x3b40 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1471 tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1489 [inline] tcp_send_syn_data net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4059 [inline] tcp_connect+0x1c0c/0x4510 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4148 tcp_v6_connect+0x156c/0x2080 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:333 __inet_stream_connect+0x3a7/0xed0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:677 tcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x3e2/0x710 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1039 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x1e82/0x3570 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1091 tcp_sendmsg+0x2f/0x50 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1358 inet6_sendmsg+0xb9/0x150 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0xf4/0x2a0 net/socket.c:733 __sys_sendto+0x29a/0x390 net/socket.c:2187 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2194 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2190 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2190 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x1d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f06553c47ed Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f0653a06fc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f0655605fa0 RCX: 00007f06553c47ed RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 00007f065545db38 R08: 0000200000000140 R09: 000000000000001c R10: f7384d4ea84b01bd R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f0655605fac R14: 00007f0655606038 R15: 00007f06539e7000 </TASK> Modules linked in: [1]: dnf install -y selinux-policy-targeted policycoreutils netlabel_tools procps-ng nmap-ncat mount -t selinuxfs none /sys/fs/selinux load_policy netlabelctl calipso add pass doi:1 netlabelctl map del default netlabelctl map add default address:::1 protocol:calipso,1 sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=2 nc -l ::1 80 & nc ::1 80 Fixes: e1adea9 ("calipso: Allow request sockets to be relabelled by the lsm.") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Reported-by: John Cheung <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAP=Rh=MvfhrGADy+-WJiftV2_WzMH4VEhEFmeT28qY+4yxNu4w@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

…mage commit 42cb74a upstream. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9426 at fs/inode.c:417 drop_nlink+0xac/0xd0 home/cc/linux/fs/inode.c:417 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9426 Comm: syz-executor568 Not tainted 6.14.0-12627-g94d471a4f428 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:drop_nlink+0xac/0xd0 home/cc/linux/fs/inode.c:417 Code: 48 8b 5d 28 be 08 00 00 00 48 8d bb 70 07 00 00 e8 f9 67 e6 ff f0 48 ff 83 70 07 00 00 5b 5d e9 9a 12 82 ff e8 95 12 82 ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 c7 45 48 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d e9 83 12 82 ff e8 fe 5f e6 ff RSP: 0018:ffffc900026b7c28 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8239710f RDX: ffff888041345a00 RSI: ffffffff8239717b RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: ffff888054509ad0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff9ab36f08 R12: ffff88804bb40000 R13: ffff8880545091e0 R14: 0000000000008000 R15: ffff8880545091e0 FS: 000055555d0c5880(0000) GS:ffff8880eb3e3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f915c55b178 CR3: 0000000050d20000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 Call Trace: <task> f2fs_i_links_write home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3194 [inline] f2fs_drop_nlink+0xd1/0x3c0 home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/dir.c:845 f2fs_delete_entry+0x542/0x1450 home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/dir.c:909 f2fs_unlink+0x45c/0x890 home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/namei.c:581 vfs_unlink+0x2fb/0x9b0 home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4544 do_unlinkat+0x4c5/0x6a0 home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4608 __do_sys_unlink home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4654 [inline] __se_sys_unlink home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4652 [inline] __x64_sys_unlink+0xc5/0x110 home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4652 do_syscall_x64 home/cc/linux/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xc7/0x250 home/cc/linux/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fb3d092324b Code: 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 57 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffdc232d938 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000057 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fb3d092324b RDX: 00007ffdc232d960 RSI: 00007ffdc232d960 RDI: 00007ffdc232d9f0 RBP: 00007ffdc232d9f0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffdc232d7c0 R10: 00000000fffffffd R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffdc232eaf0 R13: 000055555d0cebb0 R14: 00007ffdc232d958 R15: 0000000000000001 </task> Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit eedf3e3 ] ACPICA commit 1c28da2242783579d59767617121035dafba18c3 This was originally done in NetBSD: NetBSD/src@b69d1ac and is the correct alternative to the smattering of `memcpy`s I previously contributed to this repository. This also sidesteps the newly strict checks added in UBSAN: llvm/llvm-project@7926744 Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #1.2 0x000021982bc4af3c in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1.1 0x000021982bc4af3c in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1 0x000021982bc4af3c in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:395 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #2 0x000021982bc4bb6f in handletype_mismatch_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:137 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42b6f #3 0x000021982bc4b723 in __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1 compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:142 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42723 #4 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #5 0x000021afcfdf2089 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*, struct acpi_rsconvert_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsmisc.c:355 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b2089 #6 0x000021afcfded169 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resources(u8*, u32, u32, u8, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rslist.c:137 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ad169 #7 0x000021afcfe2d24a in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources(struct acpi_walk_state*, u8*, acpi_size, acpi_walk_aml_callback, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utresrc.c:237 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ed24a #8 0x000021afcfde66b7 in acpi_rs_create_resource_list(union acpi_operand_object*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rscreate.c:199 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6a66b7 #9 0x000021afcfdf6979 in acpi_rs_get_method_data(acpi_handle, const char*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsutils.c:770 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b6979 #10 0x000021afcfdf708f in acpi_walk_resources(acpi_handle, char*, acpi_walk_resource_callback, void*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsxface.c:731 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b708f #11 0x000021afcfa95dcf in acpi::acpi_impl::walk_resources(acpi::acpi_impl*, acpi_handle, const char*, acpi::Acpi::resources_callable) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:41 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x355dcf #12 0x000021afcfaa8278 in acpi::device_builder::gather_resources(acpi::device_builder*, acpi::Acpi*, fidl::any_arena&, acpi::Manager*, acpi::device_builder::gather_resources_callback) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/device-builder.cc:84 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x368278 #13 0x000021afcfbddb87 in acpi::Manager::configure_discovered_devices(acpi::Manager*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/manager.cc:75 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x49db87 #14 0x000021afcf99091d in publish_acpi_devices(acpi::Manager*, zx_device_t*, zx_device_t*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/acpi-nswalk.cc:95 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x25091d torvalds#15 0x000021afcf9c1d4e in x86::X86::do_init(x86::X86*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:60 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x281d4e torvalds#16 0x000021afcf9e33ad in λ(x86::X86::ddk_init::(anon class)*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:77 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a33ad torvalds#17 0x000021afcf9e313e in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:76:19), false, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void>::invoke(void*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:183 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a313e torvalds#18 0x000021afcfbab4c7 in fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b4c7 torvalds#19 0x000021afcfbab342 in fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b342 torvalds#20 0x000021afcfcd98c3 in async::internal::retained_task::Handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_task_t*, zx_status_t) ../../sdk/lib/async/task.cc:24 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x5998c3 torvalds#21 0x00002290f9924616 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::post_task::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:789 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a616 torvalds#22 0x00002290f9924323 in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:788:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a323 torvalds#23 0x00002290f9904b76 in fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xeab76 torvalds#24 0x00002290f9904831 in fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:471 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xea831 torvalds#25 0x00002290f98d5adc in driver_runtime::callback_request::Call(driver_runtime::callback_request*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/callback_request.h:74 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xbbadc torvalds#26 0x00002290f98e1e58 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1248 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xc7e58 torvalds#27 0x00002290f98e4159 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callbacks(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1308 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xca159 torvalds#28 0x00002290f9918414 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::create_with_adder::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:353 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe414 torvalds#29 0x00002290f991812d in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:351:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe12d torvalds#30 0x00002290f9906fc7 in fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecfc7 torvalds#31 0x00002290f9906c66 in fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecc66 torvalds#32 0x00002290f98e73d9 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::invoke_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.h:543 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd3d9 torvalds#33 0x00002290f98e700d in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::handle_event(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1442 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd00d torvalds#34 0x00002290f9918983 in async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event(async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>*, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/async_loop_owned_event_handler.h:59 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe983 torvalds#35 0x00002290f9918b9e in async::wait_method<async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>, &async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event>::call_handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async/include/lib/async/cpp/wait.h:201 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfeb9e torvalds#36 0x00002290f99bf509 in async_loop_dispatch_wait(async_loop_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:394 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a5509 torvalds#37 0x00002290f99b9958 in async_loop_run_once(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:343 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f958 torvalds#38 0x00002290f99b9247 in async_loop_run(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t, _Bool) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:301 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f247 torvalds#39 0x00002290f99ba962 in async_loop_run_thread(void*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:860 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a0962 torvalds#40 0x000041afd176ef30 in start_c11(void*) ../../zircon/third_party/ulib/musl/pthread/pthread_create.c:63 <libc.so>+0x84f30 torvalds#41 0x000041afd18a448d in thread_trampoline(uintptr_t, uintptr_t) ../../zircon/system/ulib/runtime/thread.cc:100 <libc.so>+0x1ba48d Link: acpica/acpica@1c28da22 Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <[email protected]> [ rjw: Pick up the tag from Tamir ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5d3bc9e ] This patch fixes an issue seen in a large-scale deployment under heavy incoming pkts where the aRFS flow wrongly matches a flow and reprograms the NIC with wrong settings. That mis-steering causes RX-path latency spikes and noisy neighbor effects when many connections collide on the same hash (some of our production servers have 20-30K connections). set_rps_cpu() calls ndo_rx_flow_steer() with flow_id that is calculated by hashing the skb sized by the per rx-queue table size. This results in multiple connections (even across different rx-queues) getting the same hash value. The driver steer function modifies the wrong flow to use this rx-queue, e.g.: Flow#1 is first added: Flow#1: <ip1, port1, ip2, port2>, Hash 'h', q#10 Later when a new flow needs to be added: Flow#2: <ip3, port3, ip4, port4>, Hash 'h', q#20 The driver finds the hash 'h' from Flow#1 and updates it to use q#20. This results in both flows getting un-optimized - packets for Flow#1 goes to q#20, and then reprogrammed back to q#10 later and so on; and Flow #2 programming is never done as Flow#1 is matched first for all misses. Many flows may wrongly share the same hash and reprogram rules of the original flow each with their own q#. Tested on two 144-core servers with 16K netperf sessions for 180s. Netperf clients are pinned to cores 0-71 sequentially (so that wrong packets on q#s 72-143 can be measured). IRQs are set 1:1 for queues -> CPUs, enable XPS, enable aRFS (global value is 144 * rps_flow_cnt). Test notes about results from ice_rx_flow_steer(): --------------------------------------------------- 1. "Skip:" counter increments here: if (fltr_info->q_index == rxq_idx || arfs_entry->fltr_state != ICE_ARFS_ACTIVE) goto out; 2. "Add:" counter increments here: ret = arfs_entry->fltr_info.fltr_id; INIT_HLIST_NODE(&arfs_entry->list_entry); 3. "Update:" counter increments here: /* update the queue to forward to on an already existing flow */ Runtime comparison: original code vs with the patch for different rps_flow_cnt values. +-------------------------------+--------------+--------------+ | rps_flow_cnt | 512 | 2048 | +-------------------------------+--------------+--------------+ | Ratio of Pkts on Good:Bad q's | 214 vs 822K | 1.1M vs 980K | | Avoid wrong aRFS programming | 0 vs 310K | 0 vs 30K | | CPU User | 216 vs 183 | 216 vs 206 | | CPU System | 1441 vs 1171 | 1447 vs 1320 | | CPU Softirq | 1245 vs 920 | 1238 vs 961 | | CPU Total | 29 vs 22.7 | 29 vs 24.9 | | aRFS Update | 533K vs 59 | 521K vs 32 | | aRFS Skip | 82M vs 77M | 7.2M vs 4.5M | +-------------------------------+--------------+--------------+ A separate TCP_STREAM and TCP_RR with 1,4,8,16,64,128,256,512 connections showed no performance degradation. Some points on the patch/aRFS behavior: 1. Enabling full tuple matching ensures flows are always correctly matched, even with smaller hash sizes. 2. 5-6% drop in CPU utilization as the packets arrive at the correct CPUs and fewer calls to driver for programming on misses. 3. Larger hash tables reduces mis-steering due to more unique flow hashes, but still has clashes. However, with larger per-device rps_flow_cnt, old flows take more time to expire and new aRFS flows cannot be added if h/w limits are reached (rps_may_expire_flow() succeeds when 10*rps_flow_cnt pkts have been processed by this cpu that are not part of the flow). Fixes: 28bf267 ("ice: Implement aRFS") Signed-off-by: Krishna Kumar <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Rinitha S <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 10876da ] syzkaller reported a null-ptr-deref in sock_omalloc() while allocating a CALIPSO option. [0] The NULL is of struct sock, which was fetched by sk_to_full_sk() in calipso_req_setattr(). Since commit a1a5344 ("tcp: avoid two atomic ops for syncookies"), reqsk->rsk_listener could be NULL when SYN Cookie is returned to its client, as hinted by the leading SYN Cookie log. Here are 3 options to fix the bug: 1) Return 0 in calipso_req_setattr() 2) Return an error in calipso_req_setattr() 3) Alaways set rsk_listener 1) is no go as it bypasses LSM, but 2) effectively disables SYN Cookie for CALIPSO. 3) is also no go as there have been many efforts to reduce atomic ops and make TCP robust against DDoS. See also commit 3b24d85 ("tcp/dccp: do not touch listener sk_refcnt under synflood"). As of the blamed commit, SYN Cookie already did not need refcounting, and no one has stumbled on the bug for 9 years, so no CALIPSO user will care about SYN Cookie. Let's return an error in calipso_req_setattr() and calipso_req_delattr() in the SYN Cookie case. This can be reproduced by [1] on Fedora and now connect() of nc times out. [0]: TCP: request_sock_TCPv6: Possible SYN flooding on port [::]:20002. Sending cookies. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 12262 Comm: syz.1.2611 Not tainted 6.14.0 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:406 [inline] RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:655 [inline] RIP: 0010:sock_kmalloc+0x35/0x170 net/core/sock.c:2806 Code: 89 d5 41 54 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb e8 25 e3 c6 fd e8 f0 91 e3 00 48 8d 7b 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 26 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b RSP: 0018:ffff88811af89038 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff888105266400 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff88800c890000 RDI: 0000000000000030 RBP: 0000000000000050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810526640e R10: ffffed1020a4cc81 R11: ffff88810526640f R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000820 R14: ffff888105266400 R15: 0000000000000050 FS: 00007f0653a07640(0000) GS:ffff88811af80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f863ba096f4 CR3: 00000000163c0005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 80000000 Call Trace: <IRQ> ipv6_renew_options+0x279/0x950 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1288 calipso_req_setattr+0x181/0x340 net/ipv6/calipso.c:1204 calipso_req_setattr+0x56/0x80 net/netlabel/netlabel_calipso.c:597 netlbl_req_setattr+0x18a/0x440 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1249 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request+0x1fb/0x320 security/selinux/netlabel.c:342 selinux_inet_conn_request+0x1eb/0x2c0 security/selinux/hooks.c:5551 security_inet_conn_request+0x50/0xa0 security/security.c:4945 tcp_v6_route_req+0x22c/0x550 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:825 tcp_conn_request+0xec8/0x2b70 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:7275 tcp_v6_conn_request+0x1e3/0x440 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1328 tcp_rcv_state_process+0xafa/0x52b0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6781 tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x8a6/0x1a40 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1667 tcp_v6_rcv+0x505e/0x5b50 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1904 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x17c/0x1da0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:436 ip6_input_finish+0x103/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:480 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline] ip6_input+0x13c/0x6b0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:491 dst_input include/net/dst.h:469 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish+0xb6/0x490 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0xf9/0x490 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:309 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x12e/0x1f0 net/core/dev.c:5896 __netif_receive_skb+0x1d/0x170 net/core/dev.c:6009 process_backlog+0x41e/0x13b0 net/core/dev.c:6357 __napi_poll+0xbd/0x710 net/core/dev.c:7191 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:7260 [inline] net_rx_action+0x9de/0xde0 net/core/dev.c:7382 handle_softirqs+0x19a/0x770 kernel/softirq.c:561 do_softirq.part.0+0x36/0x70 kernel/softirq.c:462 </IRQ> <TASK> do_softirq arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:26 [inline] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xf1/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:389 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline] rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:919 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0xc2a/0x3c40 net/core/dev.c:4679 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3313 [inline] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:523 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:537 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0xd69/0x1f80 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:141 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:215 [inline] ip6_finish_output+0x5dc/0xd60 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:226 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] ip6_output+0x24b/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247 dst_output include/net/dst.h:459 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline] ip6_xmit+0xbbc/0x20d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:366 inet6_csk_xmit+0x39a/0x720 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:135 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1a7b/0x3b40 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1471 tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1489 [inline] tcp_send_syn_data net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4059 [inline] tcp_connect+0x1c0c/0x4510 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4148 tcp_v6_connect+0x156c/0x2080 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:333 __inet_stream_connect+0x3a7/0xed0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:677 tcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x3e2/0x710 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1039 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x1e82/0x3570 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1091 tcp_sendmsg+0x2f/0x50 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1358 inet6_sendmsg+0xb9/0x150 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0xf4/0x2a0 net/socket.c:733 __sys_sendto+0x29a/0x390 net/socket.c:2187 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2194 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2190 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2190 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x1d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f06553c47ed Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f0653a06fc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f0655605fa0 RCX: 00007f06553c47ed RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 00007f065545db38 R08: 0000200000000140 R09: 000000000000001c R10: f7384d4ea84b01bd R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f0655605fac R14: 00007f0655606038 R15: 00007f06539e7000 </TASK> Modules linked in: [1]: dnf install -y selinux-policy-targeted policycoreutils netlabel_tools procps-ng nmap-ncat mount -t selinuxfs none /sys/fs/selinux load_policy netlabelctl calipso add pass doi:1 netlabelctl map del default netlabelctl map add default address:::1 protocol:calipso,1 sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=2 nc -l ::1 80 & nc ::1 80 Fixes: e1adea9 ("calipso: Allow request sockets to be relabelled by the lsm.") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Reported-by: John Cheung <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAP=Rh=MvfhrGADy+-WJiftV2_WzMH4VEhEFmeT28qY+4yxNu4w@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6aba0cb ] As-per the SBI specification, an SBI remote fence operation applies to the entire address space if either: 1) start_addr and size are both 0 2) size is equal to 2^XLEN-1 >From the above, only #1 is checked by SBI SFENCE calls so fix the size parameter check in SBI SFENCE calls to cover #2 as well. Fixes: 13acfec ("RISC-V: KVM: Add remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests") Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

The issue arises when kzalloc() is invoked while holding umem_mutex or any other lock acquired under umem_mutex. This is problematic because kzalloc() can trigger fs_reclaim_aqcuire(), which may, in turn, invoke mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(). This function can lead to mlx5_ib_invalidate_range(), which attempts to acquire umem_mutex again, resulting in a deadlock. The problematic flow: CPU0 | CPU1 ---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------ mlx5_ib_dereg_mr() | → revoke_mr() | → mutex_lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex) | | mlx5_mkey_cache_init() | → mutex_lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock) | → mlx5r_cache_create_ent_locked() | → kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL) | → fs_reclaim() | → mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start() | → mlx5_ib_invalidate_range() | → mutex_lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex) → cache_ent_find_and_store() | → mutex_lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock) | Additionally, when kzalloc() is called from within cache_ent_find_and_store(), we encounter the same deadlock due to re-acquisition of umem_mutex. Solve by releasing umem_mutex in dereg_mr() after umr_revoke_mr() and before acquiring rb_lock. This ensures that we don't hold umem_mutex while performing memory allocations that could trigger the reclaim path. This change prevents the deadlock by ensuring proper lock ordering and avoiding holding locks during memory allocation operations that could trigger the reclaim path. The following lockdep warning demonstrates the deadlock: python3/20557 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888387542128 (&umem_odp->umem_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x5b/0x550 [mlx5_ib] but task is already holding lock: ffffffff82f6b840 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: unmap_vmas+0x7b/0x1a0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x60/0xd0 mem_cgroup_css_alloc+0x6f/0x9b0 cgroup_init_subsys+0xa4/0x240 cgroup_init+0x1c8/0x510 start_kernel+0x747/0x760 x86_64_start_reservations+0x25/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0x73/0x80 common_startup_64+0x129/0x138 -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x91/0xd0 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x4d/0x4c0 mlx5r_cache_create_ent_locked+0x75/0x620 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_mkey_cache_init+0x186/0x360 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_stage_post_ib_reg_umr_init+0x3c/0x60 [mlx5_ib] __mlx5_ib_add+0x4b/0x190 [mlx5_ib] mlx5r_probe+0xd9/0x320 [mlx5_ib] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x42/0x70 really_probe+0xdb/0x360 __driver_probe_device+0x8f/0x130 driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xb0 __driver_attach+0xd4/0x1f0 bus_for_each_dev+0x79/0xd0 bus_add_driver+0xf0/0x200 driver_register+0x6e/0xc0 __auxiliary_driver_register+0x6a/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x390 do_init_module+0x88/0x240 init_module_from_file+0x85/0xc0 idempotent_init_module+0x104/0x300 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x68/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x98/0xf10 __mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x6f2/0x890 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x21/0x110 [mlx5_ib] ib_dereg_mr_user+0x85/0x1f0 [ib_core] uverbs_free_mr+0x19/0x30 [ib_uverbs] destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x21/0x80 [ib_uverbs] uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x60/0x3d0 [ib_uverbs] uobj_destroy+0x57/0xa0 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x4d5/0x1210 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x129/0x230 [ib_uverbs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x596/0xaa0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 -> #0 (&umem_odp->umem_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1826/0x2f00 lock_acquire+0xd3/0x2e0 __mutex_lock+0x98/0xf10 mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x5b/0x550 [mlx5_ib] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x18e/0x1f0 unmap_vmas+0x182/0x1a0 exit_mmap+0xf3/0x4a0 mmput+0x3a/0x100 do_exit+0x2b9/0xa90 do_group_exit+0x32/0xa0 get_signal+0xc32/0xcb0 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x29/0x1d0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x105/0x1d0 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 Chain exists of: &dev->cache.rb_lock --> mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start --> &umem_odp->umem_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex); lock(mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start); lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex); lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** Fixes: abb604a ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix a race for an ODP MR which leads to CQE with error") Signed-off-by: Or Har-Toov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3c8f225a8a9fade647d19b014df1172544643e4a.1750061612.git.leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>

The WARN_ON_ONCE is introduced on truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals() to capture whether the filesystem has removed all DAX entries or not. And the fix has been applied on the filesystem xfs and ext4 by the commit 0e2f80a ("fs/dax: ensure all pages are idle prior to filesystem unmount"). Apply the missed fix on filesystem fuse to fix the runtime warning: [ 2.011450] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 2.011873] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 145 at mm/truncate.c:89 truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals+0x272/0x2b0 [ 2.012468] Modules linked in: [ 2.012718] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 145 Comm: weston Not tainted 6.16.0-rc2-WSL2-STABLE #2 PREEMPT(undef) [ 2.013292] RIP: 0010:truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals+0x272/0x2b0 [ 2.013704] Code: 48 63 d0 41 29 c5 48 8d 1c d5 00 00 00 00 4e 8d 6c 2a 01 49 c1 e5 03 eb 09 48 83 c3 08 49 39 dd 74 83 41 f6 44 1c 08 01 74 ef <0f> 0b 49 8b 34 1e 48 89 ef e8 10 a2 17 00 eb df 48 8b 7d 00 e8 35 [ 2.014845] RSP: 0018:ffffa47ec33f3b10 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 2.015279] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 2.015884] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffa47ec33f3ca0 RDI: ffff98aa44f3fa80 [ 2.016377] RBP: ffff98aa44f3fbf0 R08: ffffa47ec33f3ba8 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.016942] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa47ec33f3ca0 [ 2.017437] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: ffffa47ec33f3ba8 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 2.017972] FS: 000079ce006afa40(0000) GS:ffff98aade441000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2.018510] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2.018987] CR2: 000079ce03e74000 CR3: 000000010784f006 CR4: 0000000000372eb0 [ 2.019518] Call Trace: [ 2.019729] <TASK> [ 2.019901] truncate_inode_pages_range+0xd8/0x400 [ 2.020280] ? timerqueue_add+0x66/0xb0 [ 2.020574] ? get_nohz_timer_target+0x2a/0x140 [ 2.020904] ? timerqueue_add+0x66/0xb0 [ 2.021231] ? timerqueue_del+0x2e/0x50 [ 2.021646] ? __remove_hrtimer+0x39/0x90 [ 2.022017] ? srso_alias_untrain_ret+0x1/0x10 [ 2.022497] ? psi_group_change+0x136/0x350 [ 2.023046] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x30 [ 2.023514] ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x8d/0x280 [ 2.024068] ? __schedule+0x532/0xbd0 [ 2.024551] fuse_evict_inode+0x29/0x190 [ 2.025131] evict+0x100/0x270 [ 2.025641] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x39/0x50 [ 2.026316] ? __pfx_generic_delete_inode+0x10/0x10 [ 2.026843] __dentry_kill+0x71/0x180 [ 2.027335] dput+0xeb/0x1b0 [ 2.027725] __fput+0x136/0x2b0 [ 2.028054] __x64_sys_close+0x3d/0x80 [ 2.028469] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x1b0 [ 2.028832] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 [ 2.029182] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 [ 2.029533] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 [ 2.029902] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 2.030423] RIP: 0033:0x79ce03d0d067 [ 2.030820] Code: b8 ff ff ff ff e9 3e ff ff ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 c3 a7 f8 ff [ 2.032354] RSP: 002b:00007ffef0498948 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 [ 2.032939] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffef0498960 RCX: 000079ce03d0d067 [ 2.033612] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: 000000000000000d [ 2.034289] RBP: 00007ffef0498a30 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.034944] R10: 00007ffef0498978 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 2.035610] R13: 00007ffef0498960 R14: 000079ce03e09ce0 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 2.036301] </TASK> [ 2.036532] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: bde708f ("fs/dax: always remove DAX page-cache entries when breaking layouts") Signed-off-by: Haiyue Wang <[email protected]> Cc: Alistair Popple <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

Fix cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect() to take the correct lock order and prevent the following deadlock from happening ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc3-build2+ torvalds#1301 Tainted: G S W ------------------------------------------------------ cifsd/6055 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88810ad56038 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200 but task is already holding lock: ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270 __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780 lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0 _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 cifs_setup_session+0x81/0x4b0 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x771/0x900 cifs_mount_get_session+0x7e/0x170 cifs_mount+0x92/0x2d0 cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x161/0x460 smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90 vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180 do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0 path_mount+0x6ee/0x740 do_mount+0x98/0xe0 __do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270 __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780 lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0 _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 cifs_match_super+0x101/0x320 sget+0xab/0x270 cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x1e0/0x460 smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90 vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180 do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0 path_mount+0x6ee/0x740 do_mount+0x98/0xe0 __do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_noncircular+0x95/0xc0 check_prev_add+0x115/0x2f0 validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270 __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780 lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0 _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200 __cifs_reconnect+0x8f/0x500 cifs_handle_standard+0x112/0x280 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x64d/0xbc0 kthread+0x2f7/0x310 ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x230 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &tcp_ses->srv_lock --> &ret_buf->ses_lock --> &ret_buf->chan_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock); lock(&ret_buf->ses_lock); lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock); lock(&tcp_ses->srv_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by cifsd/6055: #0: ffffffff857de398 (&cifs_tcp_ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x7b/0x200 #1: ffff888119c64060 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x9c/0x200 #2: ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200 Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Fixes: d7d7a66 ("cifs: avoid use of global locks for high contention data") Reviewed-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Tested-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>

When I run the NVME over TCP test in virtme-ng, I get the following "suspicious RCU usage" warning in nvme_mpath_add_sysfs_link(): ''' [ 5.024557][ T44] nvmet: Created nvm controller 1 for subsystem nqn.2025-06.org.nvmexpress.mptcp for NQN nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress:uuid:f7f6b5e0-ff97-4894-98ac-c85309e0bc77. [ 5.027401][ T183] nvme nvme0: creating 2 I/O queues. [ 5.029017][ T183] nvme nvme0: mapped 2/0/0 default/read/poll queues. [ 5.032587][ T183] nvme nvme0: new ctrl: NQN "nqn.2025-06.org.nvmexpress.mptcp", addr 127.0.0.1:4420, hostnqn: nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress:uuid:f7f6b5e0-ff97-4894-98ac-c85309e0bc77 [ 5.042214][ T25] [ 5.042440][ T25] ============================= [ 5.042579][ T25] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 5.042705][ T25] 6.16.0-rc3+ torvalds#23 Not tainted [ 5.042812][ T25] ----------------------------- [ 5.042934][ T25] drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c:1203 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [ 5.043111][ T25] [ 5.043111][ T25] other info that might help us debug this: [ 5.043111][ T25] [ 5.043341][ T25] [ 5.043341][ T25] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 5.043502][ T25] 3 locks held by kworker/u9:0/25: [ 5.043615][ T25] #0: ffff888008730948 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x7ed/0x1350 [ 5.043830][ T25] #1: ffffc900001afd40 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0xcf3/0x1350 [ 5.044084][ T25] #2: ffff888013ee0020 (&head->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: nvme_mpath_add_sysfs_link.part.0+0xb4/0x3a0 [ 5.044300][ T25] [ 5.044300][ T25] stack backtrace: [ 5.044439][ T25] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 25 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3+ torvalds#23 PREEMPT(full) [ 5.044441][ T25] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 5.044442][ T25] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn [ 5.044445][ T25] Call Trace: [ 5.044446][ T25] <TASK> [ 5.044449][ T25] dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0 [ 5.044453][ T25] lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4f/0xb1 [ 5.044457][ T25] nvme_mpath_add_sysfs_link.part.0+0x2fb/0x3a0 [ 5.044459][ T25] ? queue_work_on+0x90/0xf0 [ 5.044461][ T25] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x110 [ 5.044466][ T25] nvme_mpath_set_live+0x1e9/0x4f0 [ 5.044470][ T25] nvme_mpath_add_disk+0x240/0x2f0 [ 5.044472][ T25] ? __pfx_nvme_mpath_add_disk+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044475][ T25] ? add_disk_fwnode+0x361/0x580 [ 5.044480][ T25] nvme_alloc_ns+0x81c/0x17c0 [ 5.044483][ T25] ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x104/0x240 [ 5.044487][ T25] ? __pfx_nvme_alloc_ns+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044495][ T25] ? __pfx_nvme_find_get_ns+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044496][ T25] ? rcu_read_lock_any_held+0x45/0xa0 [ 5.044498][ T25] ? validate_chain+0x232/0x4f0 [ 5.044503][ T25] nvme_scan_ns+0x4c8/0x810 [ 5.044506][ T25] ? __pfx_nvme_scan_ns+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044508][ T25] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 5.044512][ T25] ? ktime_get+0x16d/0x220 [ 5.044517][ T25] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x18/0x30 [ 5.044520][ T25] ? __pfx_nvme_scan_ns_async+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044522][ T25] async_run_entry_fn+0x97/0x560 [ 5.044523][ T25] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 [ 5.044526][ T25] process_one_work+0xd3c/0x1350 [ 5.044532][ T25] ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044536][ T25] ? assign_work+0x16c/0x240 [ 5.044539][ T25] worker_thread+0x4da/0xd50 [ 5.044545][ T25] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044546][ T25] kthread+0x356/0x5c0 [ 5.044548][ T25] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044549][ T25] ? ret_from_fork+0x1b/0x2e0 [ 5.044552][ T25] ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x5d/0x180 [ 5.044553][ T25] ? ret_from_fork+0x1b/0x2e0 [ 5.044555][ T25] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 [ 5.044557][ T25] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044559][ T25] ret_from_fork+0x218/0x2e0 [ 5.044561][ T25] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044562][ T25] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 5.044570][ T25] </TASK> ''' This patch uses sleepable RCU version of helper list_for_each_entry_srcu() instead of list_for_each_entry_rcu() to fix it. Fixes: 4dbd2b2 ("nvme-multipath: Add visibility for round-robin io-policy") Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

With VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER enabled, the following warning is generated on module load: [ 324.701677] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:578 [ 324.701684] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1582, name: NetworkManager [ 324.701689] preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 [ 324.701693] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 324.701697] 2 locks held by NetworkManager/1582: [ 324.701702] #0: ffffffff9f7be770 (rtnl_mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x791/0x21e0 [ 324.701730] #1: ff1100216c380368 (_xmit_ETHER){....}-{2:2}, at: __dev_open+0x3f0/0x870 [ 324.701749] Preemption disabled at: [ 324.701752] [<ffffffff9cd23b9d>] __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701765] CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 1582 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5+ #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 324.701771] Hardware name: Intel Corporation M50FCP2SBSTD/M50FCP2SBSTD, BIOS SE5C741.86B.01.01.0001.2211140926 11/14/2022 [ 324.701774] Call Trace: [ 324.701777] <TASK> [ 324.701779] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 [ 324.701788] ? __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701793] __might_resched.cold+0x1ef/0x23d <..> [ 324.701818] __mutex_lock+0x113/0x1b80 <..> [ 324.701917] idpf_ctlq_clean_sq+0xad/0x4b0 [idpf] [ 324.701935] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 324.701941] idpf_mb_clean+0x143/0x380 [idpf] <..> [ 324.701991] idpf_send_mb_msg+0x111/0x720 [idpf] [ 324.702009] idpf_vc_xn_exec+0x4cc/0x990 [idpf] [ 324.702021] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 [ 324.702035] idpf_add_del_mac_filters+0x3ed/0xb50 [idpf] <..> [ 324.702122] __hw_addr_sync_dev+0x1cf/0x300 [ 324.702126] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [ 324.702134] idpf_set_rx_mode+0x317/0x390 [idpf] [ 324.702152] __dev_open+0x3f8/0x870 [ 324.702159] ? __pfx___dev_open+0x10/0x10 [ 324.702174] __dev_change_flags+0x443/0x650 <..> [ 324.702208] netif_change_flags+0x80/0x160 [ 324.702218] do_setlink.isra.0+0x16a0/0x3960 <..> [ 324.702349] rtnl_newlink+0x12fd/0x21e0 The sequence is as follows: rtnl_newlink()-> __dev_change_flags()-> __dev_open()-> dev_set_rx_mode() - > # disables BH and grabs "dev->addr_list_lock" idpf_set_rx_mode() -> # proceed only if VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER is ON __dev_uc_sync() -> idpf_add_mac_filter -> idpf_add_del_mac_filters -> idpf_send_mb_msg() -> idpf_mb_clean() -> idpf_ctlq_clean_sq() # mutex_lock(cq_lock) Fix by converting cq_lock to a spinlock. All operations under the new lock are safe except freeing the DMA memory, which may use vunmap(). Fix by requesting a contiguous physical memory for the DMA mapping. Fixes: a251eee ("idpf: add SRIOV support and other ndo_ops") Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Samuel Salin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>

…-flight Reject migration of SEV{-ES} state if either the source or destination VM is actively creating a vCPU, i.e. if kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() is in the section between incrementing created_vcpus and online_vcpus. The bulk of vCPU creation runs _outside_ of kvm->lock to allow creating multiple vCPUs in parallel, and so sev_info.es_active can get toggled from false=>true in the destination VM after (or during) svm_vcpu_create(), resulting in an SEV{-ES} VM effectively having a non-SEV{-ES} vCPU. The issue manifests most visibly as a crash when trying to free a vCPU's NULL VMSA page in an SEV-ES VM, but any number of things can go wrong. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffebde00000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 227 UID: 0 PID: 64063 Comm: syz.5.60023 Tainted: G U O 6.15.0-smp-DEV #2 NONE Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.52.0-0 10/28/2024 RIP: 0010:constant_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:206 [inline] RIP: 0010:arch_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:238 [inline] RIP: 0010:_test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:142 [inline] RIP: 0010:PageHead include/linux/page-flags.h:866 [inline] RIP: 0010:___free_pages+0x3e/0x120 mm/page_alloc.c:5067 Code: <49> f7 06 40 00 00 00 75 05 45 31 ff eb 0c 66 90 4c 89 f0 4c 39 f0 RSP: 0018:ffff8984551978d0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000777f80000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff918aeb98 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffebde00000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffebde00000007 R09: 1ffffd7bc0000000 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff97bc0000001 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff8983e19751a8 R14: ffffebde00000000 R15: 1ffffd7bc0000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89ee661d3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffebde00000000 CR3: 000000793ceaa000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000b5f DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> sev_free_vcpu+0x413/0x630 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:3169 svm_vcpu_free+0x13a/0x2a0 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1515 kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x6a/0x1d0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12396 kvm_vcpu_destroy virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:470 [inline] kvm_destroy_vcpus+0xd1/0x300 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:490 kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x636/0x820 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12895 kvm_put_kvm+0xb8e/0xfb0 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1310 kvm_vm_release+0x48/0x60 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1369 __fput+0x3e4/0x9e0 fs/file_table.c:465 task_work_run+0x1a9/0x220 kernel/task_work.c:227 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline] do_exit+0x7f0/0x25b0 kernel/exit.c:953 do_group_exit+0x203/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1102 get_signal+0x1357/0x1480 kernel/signal.c:3034 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x40/0x690 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x67/0xb0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x150 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f87a898e969 </TASK> Modules linked in: gq(O) gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03 CR2: ffffebde00000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Deliberately don't check for a NULL VMSA when freeing the vCPU, as crashing the host is likely desirable due to the VMSA being consumed by hardware. E.g. if KVM manages to allow VMRUN on the vCPU, hardware may read/write a bogus VMSA page. Accessing PFN 0 is "fine"-ish now that it's sequestered away thanks to L1TF, but panicking in this scenario is preferable to potentially running with corrupted state. Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Fixes: 0b020f5 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV-ES intra host migration") Fixes: b566393 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration") Cc: [email protected] Cc: James Houghton <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Gonda <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <[email protected]> Tested-by: Liam Merwick <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: James Houghton <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

If "try_verify_in_tasklet" is set for dm-verity, DM_BUFIO_CLIENT_NO_SLEEP is enabled for dm-bufio. However, when bufio tries to evict buffers, there is a chance to trigger scheduling in spin_lock_bh, the following warning is hit: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/md/dm-bufio.c:2745 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 123, name: kworker/2:2 preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 4 locks held by kworker/2:2/123: #0: ffff88800a2d1548 ((wq_completion)dm_bufio_cache){....}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0xe46/0x1970 #1: ffffc90000d97d20 ((work_completion)(&dm_bufio_replacement_work)){....}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x763/0x1970 #2: ffffffff8555b528 (dm_bufio_clients_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: do_global_cleanup+0x1ce/0x710 #3: ffff88801d5820b8 (&c->spinlock){....}-{2:2}, at: do_global_cleanup+0x2a5/0x710 Preemption disabled at: [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 123 Comm: kworker/2:2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3-g90548c634bd0 torvalds#305 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: dm_bufio_cache do_global_cleanup Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 __might_resched+0x360/0x4e0 do_global_cleanup+0x2f5/0x710 process_one_work+0x7db/0x1970 worker_thread+0x518/0xea0 kthread+0x359/0x690 ret_from_fork+0xf3/0x1b0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> That can be reproduced by: veritysetup format --data-block-size=4096 --hash-block-size=4096 /dev/vda /dev/vdb SIZE=$(blockdev --getsz /dev/vda) dmsetup create myverity -r --table "0 $SIZE verity 1 /dev/vda /dev/vdb 4096 4096 <data_blocks> 1 sha256 <root_hash> <salt> 1 try_verify_in_tasklet" mount /dev/dm-0 /mnt -o ro echo 102400 > /sys/module/dm_bufio/parameters/max_cache_size_bytes [read files in /mnt] Cc: [email protected] # v6.4+ Fixes: 450e8de ("dm bufio: improve concurrent IO performance") Signed-off-by: Wang Shuai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>

If the PHY driver uses another PHY internally (e.g. in case of eUSB2, repeaters are represented as PHYs), then it would trigger the following lockdep splat because all PHYs use a single static lockdep key and thus lockdep can not identify whether there is a dependency or not and reports a false positive. Make PHY subsystem use dynamic lockdep keys, assigning each driver a separate key. This way lockdep can correctly identify dependency graph between mutexes. ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.15.0-rc7-next-20250522-12896-g3932f283970c #3455 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/u51:0/78 is trying to acquire lock: ffff0008116554f0 (&phy->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phy_init+0x4c/0x12c but task is already holding lock: ffff000813c10cf0 (&phy->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phy_init+0x4c/0x12c other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&phy->mutex); lock(&phy->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by kworker/u51:0/78: #0: ffff000800010948 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x18c/0x5ec #1: ffff80008036bdb0 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b4/0x5ec #2: ffff0008094ac8f8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach+0x38/0x188 #3: ffff000813c10cf0 (&phy->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phy_init+0x4c/0x12c stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 78 Comm: kworker/u51:0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-next-20250522-12896-g3932f283970c #3455 PREEMPT Hardware name: Qualcomm CRD, BIOS 6.0.240904.BOOT.MXF.2.4-00528.1-HAMOA-1 09/ 4/2024 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_deadlock_bug+0x258/0x348 __lock_acquire+0x10fc/0x1f84 lock_acquire+0x1c8/0x338 __mutex_lock+0xb8/0x59c mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 phy_init+0x4c/0x12c snps_eusb2_hsphy_init+0x54/0x1a0 phy_init+0xe0/0x12c dwc3_core_init+0x450/0x10b4 dwc3_core_probe+0xce4/0x15fc dwc3_probe+0x64/0xb0 platform_probe+0x68/0xc4 really_probe+0xbc/0x298 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x12c driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x160 __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x138 bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xe0 __device_attach+0x9c/0x188 device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20 bus_probe_device+0xac/0xb0 deferred_probe_work_func+0x8c/0xc8 process_one_work+0x208/0x5ec worker_thread+0x1c0/0x368 kthread+0x14c/0x20c ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Fixes: 3584f63 ("phy: qcom: phy-qcom-snps-eusb2: Add support for eUSB2 repeater") Fixes: e246355 ("phy: amlogic: Add Amlogic AXG PCIE PHY Driver") Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Abel Vesa <[email protected]> Reported-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Tested-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>

…on 3C6000 series steppings Older steppings of the Loongson 3C6000 series incorrectly report the supported link speeds on their PCIe bridges (device IDs 3c19, 3c29) as only 2.5 GT/s, despite the upstream bus supporting speeds from 2.5 GT/s up to 16 GT/s. As a result, certain PCIe devices would be incorrectly probed as a Gen1- only, even if higher link speeds are supported, harming performance and prevents dynamic link speed functionality from being enabled in drivers such as amdgpu. Manually override the `supported_speeds` field for affected PCIe bridges with those found on the upstream bus to correctly reflect the supported link speeds. This patch is found from AOSC OS[1]. Link: #2 #1 Tested-by: Lain Fearyncess Yang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ziyao <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0b2cd50 ] generic/091 may fail, then it bisects to the bad commit ba8dac3 ("f2fs: fix to zero post-eof page"). What will cause generic/091 to fail is something like below Testcase #1: 1. write 16k as compressed blocks 2. truncate to 12k 3. truncate to 20k 4. verify data in range of [12k, 16k], however data is not zero as expected Script of Testcase #1 mkfs.f2fs -f -O extra_attr,compression /dev/vdb mount -t f2fs -o compress_extension=* /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=12k count=1 dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=4k count=1 seek=3 conv=notrunc sync truncate -s $((12*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file truncate -s $((20*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file dd if=/mnt/f2fs/file of=/mnt/f2fs/data bs=4k count=1 skip=3 od /mnt/f2fs/data umount /mnt/f2fs Analisys: in step 2), we will redirty all data pages from #0 to #3 in compressed cluster, and zero page #3, in step 3), f2fs_setattr() will call f2fs_zero_post_eof_page() to drop all page cache post eof, includeing dirtied page #3, in step 4) when we read data from page #3, it will decompressed cluster and extra random data to page #3, finally, we hit the non-zeroed data post eof. However, the commit ba8dac3 ("f2fs: fix to zero post-eof page") just let the issue be reproduced easily, w/o the commit, it can reproduce this bug w/ below Testcase #2: 1. write 16k as compressed blocks 2. truncate to 8k 3. truncate to 12k 4. truncate to 20k 5. verify data in range of [12k, 16k], however data is not zero as expected Script of Testcase #2 mkfs.f2fs -f -O extra_attr,compression /dev/vdb mount -t f2fs -o compress_extension=* /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=12k count=1 dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=4k count=1 seek=3 conv=notrunc sync truncate -s $((8*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file truncate -s $((12*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file truncate -s $((20*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches dd if=/mnt/f2fs/file of=/mnt/f2fs/data bs=4k count=1 skip=3 od /mnt/f2fs/data umount /mnt/f2fs Anlysis: in step 2), we will redirty all data pages from #0 to #3 in compressed cluster, and zero page #2 and #3, in step 3), we will truncate page #3 in page cache, in step 4), expand file size, in step 5), hit random data post eof w/ the same reason in Testcase #1. Root Cause: In f2fs_truncate_partial_cluster(), after we truncate partial data block on compressed cluster, all pages in cluster including the one post eof will be dirtied, after another tuncation, dirty page post eof will be dropped, however on-disk compressed cluster is still valid, it may include non-zero data post eof, result in exposing previous non-zero data post eof while reading. Fix: In f2fs_truncate_partial_cluster(), let change as below to fix: - call filemap_write_and_wait_range() to flush dirty page - call truncate_pagecache() to drop pages or zero partial page post eof - call f2fs_do_truncate_blocks() to truncate non-compress cluster to last valid block Fixes: 3265d3d ("f2fs: support partial truncation on compressed inode") Reported-by: Jan Prusakowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 570f945 ] Lockdep gives a splat [1] when ser_hdl_work item is executed. It is scheduled at mac80211 workqueue via ieee80211_queue_work() and takes a wiphy lock inside. However, this workqueue can be flushed when e.g. closing the interface and wiphy lock is already taken in that case. Choosing wiphy_work_queue() for SER is likely not suitable. Back on to the global workqueue. [1]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.17.0-rc2 torvalds#17 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u32:1/61 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88811bc00768 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ser_state_run+0x5e/0x180 [rtw89_core] but task is already holding lock: ffffc9000048fd30 ((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x7b5/0x1450 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 ((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: process_one_work+0x7c6/0x1450 worker_thread+0x49e/0xd00 kthread+0x313/0x640 ret_from_fork+0x221/0x300 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 ((wq_completion)phy0){+.+.}-{0:0}: touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x8e/0x180 __flush_workqueue+0x129/0x10d0 ieee80211_stop_device+0xa8/0x110 ieee80211_do_stop+0x14ce/0x2880 ieee80211_stop+0x13a/0x2c0 __dev_close_many+0x18f/0x510 __dev_change_flags+0x25f/0x670 netif_change_flags+0x7b/0x160 do_setlink.isra.0+0x1640/0x35d0 rtnl_newlink+0xd8c/0x1d30 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x700/0xb80 netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x350 netlink_unicast+0x49a/0x7a0 netlink_sendmsg+0x759/0xc20 ____sys_sendmsg+0x812/0xa00 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x180 __sys_sendmsg+0x11f/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x360 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x124c/0x1d20 lock_acquire+0x154/0x2e0 __mutex_lock+0x17b/0x12f0 ser_state_run+0x5e/0x180 [rtw89_core] rtw89_ser_hdl_work+0x119/0x220 [rtw89_core] process_one_work+0x82d/0x1450 worker_thread+0x49e/0xd00 kthread+0x313/0x640 ret_from_fork+0x221/0x300 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &rdev->wiphy.mtx --> (wq_completion)phy0 --> (work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work) Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)); lock((wq_completion)phy0); lock((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)); lock(&rdev->wiphy.mtx); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by kworker/u32:1/61: #0: ffff888103835148 ((wq_completion)phy0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0xefa/0x1450 #1: ffffc9000048fd30 ((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x7b5/0x1450 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 61 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2 torvalds#17 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS edk2-20250523-14.fc42 05/23/2025 Workqueue: phy0 rtw89_ser_hdl_work [rtw89_core] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1be check_noncircular+0x14c/0x170 __lock_acquire+0x124c/0x1d20 lock_acquire+0x154/0x2e0 __mutex_lock+0x17b/0x12f0 ser_state_run+0x5e/0x180 [rtw89_core] rtw89_ser_hdl_work+0x119/0x220 [rtw89_core] process_one_work+0x82d/0x1450 worker_thread+0x49e/0xd00 kthread+0x313/0x640 ret_from_fork+0x221/0x300 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: ebfc919 ("wifi: rtw89: add wiphy_lock() to work that isn't held wiphy_lock() yet") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]> Acked-by: Ping-Ke Shih <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit edf7e90 ] As JY reported in bugzilla [1], Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 pc : [0xffffffe51d249484] f2fs_is_cp_guaranteed+0x70/0x98 lr : [0xffffffe51d24adbc] f2fs_merge_page_bio+0x520/0x6d4 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 6790 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Tainted: P B W OE 6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 5f7701c9cbf727d1eebe77c89bbbeb3371e895e5 Tainted: [P]=PROPRIETARY_MODULE, [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-254:49) Call trace: f2fs_is_cp_guaranteed+0x70/0x98 f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x174/0x2f4 f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x214/0x81c f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x28c/0x764 f2fs_write_data_pages+0x78c/0xce4 do_writepages+0xe8/0x2fc __writeback_single_inode+0x4c/0x4b4 writeback_sb_inodes+0x314/0x540 __writeback_inodes_wb+0xa4/0xf4 wb_writeback+0x160/0x448 wb_workfn+0x2f0/0x5dc process_scheduled_works+0x1c8/0x458 worker_thread+0x334/0x3f0 kthread+0x118/0x1ac ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220575 The panic was caused by UAF issue w/ below race condition: kworker - writepages - f2fs_write_cache_pages - f2fs_write_single_data_page - f2fs_do_write_data_page - f2fs_inplace_write_data - f2fs_merge_page_bio - add_inu_page : cache page #1 into bio & cache bio in io->bio_list - f2fs_write_single_data_page - f2fs_do_write_data_page - f2fs_inplace_write_data - f2fs_merge_page_bio - add_inu_page : cache page #2 into bio which is linked in io->bio_list write - f2fs_write_begin : write page #1 - f2fs_folio_wait_writeback - f2fs_submit_merged_ipu_write - f2fs_submit_write_bio : submit bio which inclues page #1 and #2 software IRQ - f2fs_write_end_io - fscrypt_free_bounce_page : freed bounced page which belongs to page #2 - inc_page_count( , WB_DATA_TYPE(data_folio), false) : data_folio points to fio->encrypted_page the bounced page can be freed before accessing it in f2fs_is_cp_guarantee() It can reproduce w/ below testcase: Run below script in shell #1: for ((i=1;i>0;i++)) do xfs_io -f /mnt/f2fs/enc/file \ -c "pwrite 0 32k" -c "fdatasync" Run below script in shell #2: for ((i=1;i>0;i++)) do xfs_io -f /mnt/f2fs/enc/file \ -c "pwrite 0 32k" -c "fdatasync" So, in f2fs_merge_page_bio(), let's avoid using fio->encrypted_page after commit page into internal ipu cache. Fixes: 0b20fce ("f2fs: cache global IPU bio") Reported-by: JY <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

…on 3C6000 series steppings Older steppings of the Loongson 3C6000 series incorrectly report the supported link speeds on their PCIe bridges (device IDs 3c19, 3c29) as only 2.5 GT/s, despite the upstream bus supporting speeds from 2.5 GT/s up to 16 GT/s. As a result, certain PCIe devices would be incorrectly probed as a Gen1- only, even if higher link speeds are supported, harming performance and prevents dynamic link speed functionality from being enabled in drivers such as amdgpu. Manually override the `supported_speeds` field for affected PCIe bridges with those found on the upstream bus to correctly reflect the supported link speeds. This patch is found from AOSC OS[1]. Link: #2 #1 Tested-by: Lain Fearyncess Yang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ziyao <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]>

Expand the prefault memory selftest to add a regression test for a KVM bug where KVM's retry logic would result in (breakable) deadlock due to the memslot deletion waiting on prefaulting to release SRCU, and prefaulting waiting on the memslot to fully disappear (KVM uses a two-step process to delete memslots, and KVM x86 retries page faults if a to-be-deleted, a.k.a. INVALID, memslot is encountered). To exercise concurrent memslot remove, spawn a second thread to initiate memslot removal at roughly the same time as prefaulting. Test memslot removal for all testcases, i.e. don't limit concurrent removal to only the success case. There are essentially three prefault scenarios (so far) that are of interest: 1. Success 2. ENOENT due to no memslot 3. EAGAIN due to INVALID memslot For all intents and purposes, #1 and #2 are mutually exclusive, or rather, easier to test via separate testcases since writing to non-existent memory is trivial. But for #3, making it mutually exclusive with #1 _or_ #2 is actually more complex than testing memslot removal for all scenarios. The only requirement to let memslot removal coexist with other scenarios is a way to guarantee a stable result, e.g. that the "no memslot" test observes ENOENT, not EAGAIN, for the final checks. So, rather than make memslot removal mutually exclusive with the ENOENT scenario, simply restore the memslot and retry prefaulting. For the "no memslot" case, KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY should be idempotent, i.e. should always fail with ENOENT regardless of how many times userspace attempts prefaulting. Pass in both the base GPA and the offset (instead of the "full" GPA) so that the worker can recreate the memslot. Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Since blamed commit, unregister_netdevice_many_notify() takes the netdev mutex if the device needs it. If the device list is too long, this will lock more device mutexes than lockdep can handle: unshare -n \ bash -c 'for i in $(seq 1 100);do ip link add foo$i type dummy;done' BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by kworker/u16:1/69: #0: ..148 ((wq_completion)netns){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ..d40 (net_cleanup_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ..bd0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: cleanup_net #3: ..aa8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: default_device_exit_batch #4: ..cb0 (&dev_instance_lock_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: unregister_netdevice_many_notify [..] Add a helper to close and then unlock a list of net_devices. Devices that are not up have to be skipped - netif_close_many always removes them from the list without any other actions taken, so they'd remain in locked state. Close devices whenever we've used up half of the tracking slots or we processed entire list without hitting the limit. Fixes: 7e4d784 ("net: hold netdev instance lock during rtnetlink operations") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 48918ca ] The test starts a workload and then opens events. If the events fail to open, for example because of perf_event_paranoid, the gopipe of the workload is leaked and the file descriptor leak check fails when the test exits. To avoid this cancel the workload when opening the events fails. Before: ``` $ perf test -vv 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields: --- start --- test child forked, pid 1189568 Using CPUID GenuineIntel-6-B7-1 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 Attempt to add: software/cpu-clock/ ..after resolving event: software/config=0/ cpu-clock -> software/cpu-clock/ ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 1 (PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE) size 136 config 0x9 (PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY) sample_type IP|TID|TIME|CPU read_format ID|LOST disabled 1 inherit 1 mmap 1 comm 1 enable_on_exec 1 task 1 sample_id_all 1 mmap2 1 comm_exec 1 ksymbol 1 bpf_event 1 { wakeup_events, wakeup_watermark } 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 1189569 cpu 0 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 perf_evlist__open: Permission denied ---- end(-2) ---- Leak of file descriptor 6 that opened: 'pipe:[14200347]' ---- unexpected signal (6) ---- iFailed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon #0 0x565358f6666e in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:311 #1 0x7f29ce849df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0 #2 0x7f29ce89e95c in __pthread_kill_implementation pthread_kill.c:44 #3 0x7f29ce849cc2 in raise raise.c:27 #4 0x7f29ce8324ac in abort abort.c:81 #5 0x565358f662d4 in check_leaks builtin-test.c:226 #6 0x565358f6682e in run_test_child builtin-test.c:344 #7 0x565358ef7121 in start_command run-command.c:128 #8 0x565358f67273 in start_test builtin-test.c:545 #9 0x565358f6771d in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:647 #10 0x565358f682bd in cmd_test builtin-test.c:849 #11 0x565358ee5ded in run_builtin perf.c:349 #12 0x565358ee6085 in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 #13 0x565358ee61de in run_argv perf.c:448 #14 0x565358ee6527 in main perf.c:555 torvalds#15 0x7f29ce833ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74 torvalds#16 0x7f29ce833d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128 torvalds#17 0x565358e391c1 in _start perf[851c1] 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : FAILED! ``` After: ``` $ perf test 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Skip (permissions) ``` Fixes: 16d00fe ("perf tests: Move test__PERF_RECORD into separate object") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]> Cc: Chun-Tse Shao <[email protected]> Cc: Howard Chu <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: James Clark <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 0dccbc7 upstream. When running as an SNP or TDX guest under KVM, force the legacy PCI hole, i.e. memory between Top of Lower Usable DRAM and 4GiB, to be mapped as UC via a forced variable MTRR range. In most KVM-based setups, legacy devices such as the HPET and TPM are enumerated via ACPI. ACPI enumeration includes a Memory32Fixed entry, and optionally a SystemMemory descriptor for an OperationRegion, e.g. if the device needs to be accessed via a Control Method. If a SystemMemory entry is present, then the kernel's ACPI driver will auto-ioremap the region so that it can be accessed at will. However, the ACPI spec doesn't provide a way to enumerate the memory type of SystemMemory regions, i.e. there's no way to tell software that a region must be mapped as UC vs. WB, etc. As a result, Linux's ACPI driver always maps SystemMemory regions using ioremap_cache(), i.e. as WB on x86. The dedicated device drivers however, e.g. the HPET driver and TPM driver, want to map their associated memory as UC or WC, as accessing PCI devices using WB is unsupported. On bare metal and non-CoCO, the conflicting requirements "work" as firmware configures the PCI hole (and other device memory) to be UC in the MTRRs. So even though the ACPI mappings request WB, they are forced to UC- in the kernel's tracking due to the kernel properly handling the MTRR overrides, and thus are compatible with the drivers' requested WC/UC-. With force WB MTRRs on SNP and TDX guests, the ACPI mappings get their requested WB if the ACPI mappings are established before the dedicated driver code attempts to initialize the device. E.g. if acpi_init() runs before the corresponding device driver is probed, ACPI's WB mapping will "win", and result in the driver's ioremap() failing because the existing WB mapping isn't compatible with the requested WC/UC-. E.g. when a TPM is emulated by the hypervisor (ignoring the security implications of relying on what is allegedly an untrusted entity to store measurements), the TPM driver will request UC and fail: [ 1.730459] ioremap error for 0xfed40000-0xfed45000, requested 0x2, got 0x0 [ 1.732780] tpm_tis MSFT0101:00: probe with driver tpm_tis failed with error -12 Note, the '0x2' and '0x0' values refer to "enum page_cache_mode", not x86's memtypes (which frustratingly are an almost pure inversion; 2 == WB, 0 == UC). E.g. tracing mapping requests for TPM TIS yields: Mapping TPM TIS with req_type = 0 WARNING: CPU: 22 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:530 memtype_reserve+0x2ab/0x460 Modules linked in: CPU: 22 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.16.0-rc7+ #2 VOLUNTARY Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/29/2025 RIP: 0010:memtype_reserve+0x2ab/0x460 __ioremap_caller+0x16d/0x3d0 ioremap_cache+0x17/0x30 x86_acpi_os_ioremap+0xe/0x20 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x1f3/0x240 acpi_os_map_memory+0xe/0x20 acpi_ex_system_memory_space_handler+0x273/0x440 acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch+0x176/0x4c0 acpi_ex_access_region+0x2ad/0x530 acpi_ex_field_datum_io+0xa2/0x4f0 acpi_ex_extract_from_field+0x296/0x3e0 acpi_ex_read_data_from_field+0xd1/0x460 acpi_ex_resolve_node_to_value+0x2ee/0x530 acpi_ex_resolve_to_value+0x1f2/0x540 acpi_ds_evaluate_name_path+0x11b/0x190 acpi_ds_exec_end_op+0x456/0x960 acpi_ps_parse_loop+0x27a/0xa50 acpi_ps_parse_aml+0x226/0x600 acpi_ps_execute_method+0x172/0x3e0 acpi_ns_evaluate+0x175/0x5f0 acpi_evaluate_object+0x213/0x490 acpi_evaluate_integer+0x6d/0x140 acpi_bus_get_status+0x93/0x150 acpi_add_single_object+0x43a/0x7c0 acpi_bus_check_add+0x149/0x3a0 acpi_bus_check_add_1+0x16/0x30 acpi_ns_walk_namespace+0x22c/0x360 acpi_walk_namespace+0x15c/0x170 acpi_bus_scan+0x1dd/0x200 acpi_scan_init+0xe5/0x2b0 acpi_init+0x264/0x5b0 do_one_initcall+0x5a/0x310 kernel_init_freeable+0x34f/0x4f0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x186/0x1b0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> The above traces are from a Google-VMM based VM, but the same behavior happens with a QEMU based VM that is modified to add a SystemMemory range for the TPM TIS address space. The only reason this doesn't cause problems for HPET, which appears to require a SystemMemory region, is because HPET gets special treatment via x86_init.timers.timer_init(), and so gets a chance to create its UC- mapping before acpi_init() clobbers things. Disabling the early call to hpet_time_init() yields the same behavior for HPET: [ 0.318264] ioremap error for 0xfed00000-0xfed01000, requested 0x2, got 0x0 Hack around the ACPI gap by forcing the legacy PCI hole to UC when overriding the (virtual) MTRRs for CoCo guest, so that ioremap handling of MTRRs naturally kicks in and forces the ACPI mappings to be UC. Note, the requested/mapped memtype doesn't actually matter in terms of accessing the device. In practically every setup, legacy PCI devices are emulated by the hypervisor, and accesses are intercepted and handled as emulated MMIO, i.e. never access physical memory and thus don't have an effective memtype. Even in a theoretical setup where such devices are passed through by the host, i.e. point at real MMIO memory, it is KVM's (as the hypervisor) responsibility to force the memory to be WC/UC, e.g. via EPT memtype under TDX or real hardware MTRRs under SNP. Not doing so cannot work, and the hypervisor is highly motivated to do the right thing as letting the guest access hardware MMIO with WB would likely result in a variety of fatal #MCs. In other words, forcing the range to be UC is all about coercing the kernel's tracking into thinking that it has established UC mappings, so that the ioremap code doesn't reject mappings from e.g. the TPM driver and thus prevent the driver from loading and the device from functioning. Note #2, relying on guest firmware to handle this scenario, e.g. by setting virtual MTRRs and then consuming them in Linux, is not a viable option, as the virtual MTRR state is managed by the untrusted hypervisor, and because OVMF at least has stopped programming virtual MTRRs when running as a TDX guest. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected] Fixes: 8e690b8 ("x86/kvm: Override default caching mode for SEV-SNP and TDX") Cc: [email protected] Cc: Peter Gonda <[email protected]> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]> Cc: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Cc: Jürgen Groß <[email protected]> Cc: Korakit Seemakhupt <[email protected]> Cc: Jianxiong Gao <[email protected]> Cc: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Korakit Seemakhupt <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 0570327 upstream. Before disabling SR-IOV via config space accesses to the parent PF, sriov_disable() first removes the PCI devices representing the VFs. Since commit 9d16947 ("PCI: Add global pci_lock_rescan_remove()") such removal operations are serialized against concurrent remove and rescan using the pci_rescan_remove_lock. No such locking was ever added in sriov_disable() however. In particular when commit 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") factored out the PCI device removal into sriov_del_vfs() there was still no locking around the pci_iov_remove_virtfn() calls. On s390 the lack of serialization in sriov_disable() may cause double remove and list corruption with the below (amended) trace being observed: PSW: 0704c00180000000 0000000c914e4b38 (klist_put+56) GPRS: 000003800313fb48 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0000000000000001 00000000f9b520a8 0000000000000000 0000000000002fbd 00000000f4cc9480 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180692828 00000000818e8000 000003800313fe2c 000003800313fb20 000003800313fad8 #0 [3800313fb20] device_del at c9158ad5c #1 [3800313fb88] pci_remove_bus_device at c915105ba #2 [3800313fbd0] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at c9152f198 #3 [3800313fc28] zpci_iov_remove_virtfn at c90fb67c0 #4 [3800313fc60] zpci_bus_remove_device at c90fb6104 #5 [3800313fca0] __zpci_event_availability at c90fb3dca #6 [3800313fd08] chsc_process_sei_nt0 at c918fe4a2 #7 [3800313fd60] crw_collect_info at c91905822 #8 [3800313fe10] kthread at c90feb390 #9 [3800313fe68] __ret_from_fork at c90f6aa64 #10 [3800313fe98] ret_from_fork at c9194f3f2. This is because in addition to sriov_disable() removing the VFs, the platform also generates hot-unplug events for the VFs. This being the reverse operation to the hotplug events generated by sriov_enable() and handled via pdev->no_vf_scan. And while the event processing takes pci_rescan_remove_lock and checks whether the struct pci_dev still exists, the lack of synchronization makes this checking racy. Other races may also be possible of course though given that this lack of locking persisted so long observable races seem very rare. Even on s390 the list corruption was only observed with certain devices since the platform events are only triggered by config accesses after the removal, so as long as the removal finished synchronously they would not race. Either way the locking is missing so fix this by adding it to the sriov_del_vfs() helper. Just like PCI rescan-remove, locking is also missing in sriov_add_vfs() including for the error case where pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device() is called without the PCI rescan-remove lock being held. Even in the non-error case, adding new PCI devices and buses should be serialized via the PCI rescan-remove lock. Add the necessary locking. Fixes: 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Julian Ruess <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7f0fddd ] Since blamed commit, unregister_netdevice_many_notify() takes the netdev mutex if the device needs it. If the device list is too long, this will lock more device mutexes than lockdep can handle: unshare -n \ bash -c 'for i in $(seq 1 100);do ip link add foo$i type dummy;done' BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by kworker/u16:1/69: #0: ..148 ((wq_completion)netns){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ..d40 (net_cleanup_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ..bd0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: cleanup_net #3: ..aa8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: default_device_exit_batch #4: ..cb0 (&dev_instance_lock_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: unregister_netdevice_many_notify [..] Add a helper to close and then unlock a list of net_devices. Devices that are not up have to be skipped - netif_close_many always removes them from the list without any other actions taken, so they'd remain in locked state. Close devices whenever we've used up half of the tracking slots or we processed entire list without hitting the limit. Fixes: 7e4d784 ("net: hold netdev instance lock during rtnetlink operations") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

…on 3C6000 series steppings Older steppings of the Loongson 3C6000 series incorrectly report the supported link speeds on their PCIe bridges (device IDs 3c19, 3c29) as only 2.5 GT/s, despite the upstream bus supporting speeds from 2.5 GT/s up to 16 GT/s. As a result, certain PCIe devices would be incorrectly probed as a Gen1- only, even if higher link speeds are supported, harming performance and prevents dynamic link speed functionality from being enabled in drivers such as amdgpu. Manually override the `supported_speeds` field for affected PCIe bridges with those found on the upstream bus to correctly reflect the supported link speeds. This patch is found from AOSC OS[1]. Link: #2 #1 Tested-by: Lain Fearyncess Yang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ziyao <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7f0fddd ] Since blamed commit, unregister_netdevice_many_notify() takes the netdev mutex if the device needs it. If the device list is too long, this will lock more device mutexes than lockdep can handle: unshare -n \ bash -c 'for i in $(seq 1 100);do ip link add foo$i type dummy;done' BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by kworker/u16:1/69: #0: ..148 ((wq_completion)netns){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ..d40 (net_cleanup_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ..bd0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: cleanup_net #3: ..aa8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: default_device_exit_batch #4: ..cb0 (&dev_instance_lock_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: unregister_netdevice_many_notify [..] Add a helper to close and then unlock a list of net_devices. Devices that are not up have to be skipped - netif_close_many always removes them from the list without any other actions taken, so they'd remain in locked state. Close devices whenever we've used up half of the tracking slots or we processed entire list without hitting the limit. Fixes: 7e4d784 ("net: hold netdev instance lock during rtnetlink operations") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

…on 3C6000 series steppings Older steppings of the Loongson 3C6000 series incorrectly report the supported link speeds on their PCIe bridges (device IDs 3c19, 3c29) as only 2.5 GT/s, despite the upstream bus supporting speeds from 2.5 GT/s up to 16 GT/s. As a result, certain PCIe devices would be incorrectly probed as a Gen1- only, even if higher link speeds are supported, harming performance and prevents dynamic link speed functionality from being enabled in drivers such as amdgpu. Manually override the `supported_speeds` field for affected PCIe bridges with those found on the upstream bus to correctly reflect the supported link speeds. This patch is found from AOSC OS[1]. Link: #2 #1 Tested-by: Lain Fearyncess Yang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ziyao <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]>

The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 Tainted: G S U ------------------------------------------------------ xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 but task is already holding lock: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0 devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}: kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0 remove_files+0x54/0x70 sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100 device_del+0x15d/0x3b0 devcd_del+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0 kthread+0x11c/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&devcd->mutex); lock(kn->active#236); lock(&devcd->mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091: #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 #1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220 #2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280 #3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 #4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660 stack backtrace: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S U 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)} Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000 </TASK> xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted. Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work") Cc: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…on 3C6000 series steppings Older steppings of the Loongson 3C6000 series incorrectly report the supported link speeds on their PCIe bridges (device IDs 3c19, 3c29) as only 2.5 GT/s, despite the upstream bus supporting speeds from 2.5 GT/s up to 16 GT/s. As a result, certain PCIe devices would be incorrectly probed as a Gen1- only, even if higher link speeds are supported, harming performance and prevents dynamic link speed functionality from being enabled in drivers such as amdgpu. Manually override the `supported_speeds` field for affected PCIe bridges with those found on the upstream bus to correctly reflect the supported link speeds. This patch is found from AOSC OS[1]. Link: #2 #1 Tested-by: Lain Fearyncess Yang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ziyao <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]>

commit a91c809 upstream. The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 Tainted: G S U ------------------------------------------------------ xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 but task is already holding lock: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0 devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}: kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0 remove_files+0x54/0x70 sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100 device_del+0x15d/0x3b0 devcd_del+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0 kthread+0x11c/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&devcd->mutex); lock(kn->active#236); lock(&devcd->mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091: #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 #1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220 #2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280 #3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 #4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660 stack backtrace: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S U 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)} Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000 </TASK> xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted. Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work") Cc: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…on 3C6000 series steppings Older steppings of the Loongson 3C6000 series incorrectly report the supported link speeds on their PCIe bridges (device IDs 3c19, 3c29) as only 2.5 GT/s, despite the upstream bus supporting speeds from 2.5 GT/s up to 16 GT/s. As a result, certain PCIe devices would be incorrectly probed as a Gen1- only, even if higher link speeds are supported, harming performance and prevents dynamic link speed functionality from being enabled in drivers such as amdgpu. Manually override the `supported_speeds` field for affected PCIe bridges with those found on the upstream bus to correctly reflect the supported link speeds. This patch is found from AOSC OS[1]. Link: #2 #1 Tested-by: Lain Fearyncess Yang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ziyao <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]>

commit a91c809 upstream. The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 Tainted: G S U ------------------------------------------------------ xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 but task is already holding lock: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0 devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}: kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0 remove_files+0x54/0x70 sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100 device_del+0x15d/0x3b0 devcd_del+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0 kthread+0x11c/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&devcd->mutex); lock(kn->active#236); lock(&devcd->mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091: #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 #1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220 #2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280 #3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 #4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660 stack backtrace: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S U 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)} Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000 </TASK> xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted. Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work") Cc: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…on 3C6000 series steppings Older steppings of the Loongson 3C6000 series incorrectly report the supported link speeds on their PCIe bridges (device IDs 3c19, 3c29) as only 2.5 GT/s, despite the upstream bus supporting speeds from 2.5 GT/s up to 16 GT/s. As a result, certain PCIe devices would be incorrectly probed as a Gen1- only, even if higher link speeds are supported, harming performance and prevents dynamic link speed functionality from being enabled in drivers such as amdgpu. Manually override the `supported_speeds` field for affected PCIe bridges with those found on the upstream bus to correctly reflect the supported link speeds. This patch is found from AOSC OS[1]. Link: #2 #1 Tested-by: Lain Fearyncess Yang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ziyao <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]>

Add VMX exit handlers for SEAMCALL and TDCALL to inject a #UD if a non-TD guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL. Neither SEAMCALL nor TDCALL is gated by any software enablement other than VMXON, and so will generate a VM-Exit instead of e.g. a native #UD when executed from the guest kernel. Note! No unprivileged DoS of the L1 kernel is possible as TDCALL and SEAMCALL #GP at CPL > 0, and the CPL check is performed prior to the VMX non-root (VM-Exit) check, i.e. userspace can't crash the VM. And for a nested guest, KVM forwards unknown exits to L1, i.e. an L2 kernel can crash itself, but not L1. Note #2! The Intel® Trust Domain CPU Architectural Extensions spec's pseudocode shows the CPL > 0 check for SEAMCALL coming _after_ the VM-Exit, but that appears to be a documentation bug (likely because the CPL > 0 check was incorrectly bundled with other lower-priority #GP checks). Testing on SPR and EMR shows that the CPL > 0 check is performed before the VMX non-root check, i.e. SEAMCALL #GPs when executed in usermode. Note #3! The aforementioned Trust Domain spec uses confusing pseudocode that says that SEAMCALL will #UD if executed "inSEAM", but "inSEAM" specifically means in SEAM Root Mode, i.e. in the TDX-Module. The long- form description explicitly states that SEAMCALL generates an exit when executed in "SEAM VMX non-root operation". But that's a moot point as the TDX-Module injects #UD if the guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL, as documented in the "Unconditionally Blocked Instructions" section of the TDX-Module base specification. Cc: [email protected] Cc: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Cc: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Cc: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks. [86.861179] ====================================================== [86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G U [86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------ [86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock: [86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.861290] but task is already holding lock: [86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.862233] which lock already depends on the new lock. [86.862251] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [86.862265] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390 [86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862399] -> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390 [86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862509] -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0 [86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280 [86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0 [86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0 [86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180 [86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480 [86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0 [86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140 [86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660 [86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.862703] -> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0 [86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0 [86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0 [86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20 [86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30 [86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850 [86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 [86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 [86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50 [86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862947] -> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0 [86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 [86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 [86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0 [86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 [86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 [86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 [86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [86.863114] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.863152] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.863166] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.863180] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.863194] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.863987] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.864735] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.865510] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.866248] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.866983] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.867719] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.868453] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.869228] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.870001] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.870774] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.871546] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.872330] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.873057] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.873782] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.873802] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.873817] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.873833] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.873848] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.873862] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.873876] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.873892] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.873904] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.873917] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.873931] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.873945] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.874678] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.875347] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.875369] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.875385] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.875398] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.875413] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.875426] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.875440] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.875454] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.875470] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.875486] other info that might help us debug this: [86.875502] Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [86.875539] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [86.875552] CPU0 CPU1 [86.875563] ---- ---- [86.875573] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875588] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [86.875606] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875624] rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); [86.875637] *** DEADLOCK *** [86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432: [86.875663] #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220 [86.875699] #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.876512] #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.877305] stack backtrace: [86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER [86.877336] Hardware name: /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020 [86.877339] Call Trace: [86.877344] <TASK> [86.877353] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [86.877364] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [86.877369] print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 [86.877379] check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 [86.877390] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.877403] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.877408] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.877422] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878173] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.878182] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878191] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878916] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878927] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.879652] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.880375] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.881133] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.881851] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.882566] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.883286] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.884003] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.884756] ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915] [86.885513] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.886281] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.887049] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.887819] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.888587] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.889293] ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20 [86.889301] ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190 [86.889308] ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80 [86.889321] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.890038] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.890049] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.890058] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.890067] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.890072] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.890078] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.890083] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [86.890088] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.890097] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.890101] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.890107] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.890113] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.890119] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.890833] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.891482] ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.892135] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.892145] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470 [86.892157] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.892164] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.892168] ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300 [86.892185] ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320 [86.892195] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892199] ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892211] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.892224] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.892230] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.892236] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.892243] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [86.892249] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [86.892256] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d [86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d [86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c [86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80 [86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0 [86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710 [86.892304] </TASK> Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case. v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi), - mention target environments in commit message. Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985 Cc: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <[email protected]> Acked-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 648ef13) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>

When a connector is connected but inactive (e.g., disabled by desktop environments), pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg will be destroyed. Then, reading odm_combine_segments causes kernel NULL pointer dereference. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 26474 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.17.0+ #2 PREEMPT(lazy) e6a17af9ee6db7c63e9d90dbe5b28ccab67520c6 Hardware name: LENOVO 21Q4/LNVNB161216, BIOS PXCN25WW 03/27/2025 RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> seq_read_iter+0x125/0x490 ? __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18f/0x350 seq_read+0x12c/0x170 full_proxy_read+0x51/0x80 vfs_read+0xbc/0x390 ? __handle_mm_fault+0xa46/0xef0 ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ksys_read+0x73/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ? count_memcg_events+0xc2/0x190 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2d0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x21a/0x690 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 RIP: 0033:0x7f44d4031687 Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00> RSP: 002b:00007ffdb4b5f0b0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f44d3f9f740 RCX: 00007f44d4031687 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007f44d3f5e000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000040000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f44d3f5e000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000 </TASK> Modules linked in: tls tcp_diag inet_diag xt_mark ccm snd_hrtimer snd_seq_dummy snd_seq_midi snd_seq_oss snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device x> snd_hda_codec_atihdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek_lib lenovo_wmi_helpers think_lmi snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_soc_core kvm snd_compress uvcvideo sn> platform_profile joydev amd_pmc mousedev mac_hid sch_fq_codel uinput i2c_dev parport_pc ppdev lp parport nvme_fabrics loop nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables dm_cryp> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Fix this by checking pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg before dereferencing. Fixes: 07926ba ("drm/amd/display: Add debugfs interface for ODM combine info") Signed-off-by: Rong Zhang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mario Limoncello <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f19bbec) Cc: [email protected]

Michael Chan says: ==================== bnxt_en: Bug fixes Patches 1, 3, and 4 are bug fixes related to the FW log tracing driver coredump feature recently added in 6.13. Patch #1 adds the necessary call to shutdown the FW logging DMA during PCI shutdown. Patch #3 fixes a possible null pointer derefernce when using early versions of the FW with this feature. Patch #4 adds the coredump header information unconditionally to make it more robust. Patch #2 fixes a possible memory leak during PTP shutdown. Patch #5 eliminates a dmesg warning when doing devlink reload. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.18, take #2 - Fix check for local interrupts on riscv32 - Read HGEIP CSR on the correct cpu when checking for IMSIC interrupts - Remove automatic I/O mapping from kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region()

…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm654 fixes for 6.18, take #2 * Core fixes - Fix trapping regression when no in-kernel irqchip is present ([email protected]) - Check host-provided, untrusted ranges and offsets in pKVM ([email protected]) ([email protected]) - Fix regression restoring the ID_PFR1_EL1 register ([email protected] - Fix vgic ITS locking issues when LPIs are not directly injected ([email protected]) * Test fixes - Correct target CPU programming in vgic_lpi_stress selftest ([email protected]) - Fix exposure of SCTLR2_EL2 and ZCR_EL2 in get-reg-list selftest (20251023-b4-kvm-arm64-get-reg-list-sctlr-el2-v1-1-088f88ff992a@kernel.org) (20251024-kvm-arm64-get-reg-list-zcr-el2-v1-1-0cd0ff75e22f@kernel.org) * Misc - Update Oliver's email address ([email protected])

…on 3C6000 series steppings Older steppings of the Loongson 3C6000 series incorrectly report the supported link speeds on their PCIe bridges (device IDs 3c19, 3c29) as only 2.5 GT/s, despite the upstream bus supporting speeds from 2.5 GT/s up to 16 GT/s. As a result, certain PCIe devices would be incorrectly probed as a Gen1- only, even if higher link speeds are supported, harming performance and prevents dynamic link speed functionality from being enabled in drivers such as amdgpu. Manually override the `supported_speeds` field for affected PCIe bridges with those found on the upstream bus to correctly reflect the supported link speeds. This patch is found from AOSC OS[1]. Link: #2 #1 Tested-by: Lain Fearyncess Yang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ayden Meng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ziyao <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]>

AydenMeng force-pushed the v6.14.10-rc1 branch from eeebfde to 1313c7e Compare June 4, 2025 04:01

AydenMeng changed the title ~~PCI: loongson: Fix supported link speeds for Loongson 3c19/3c29 PCIe~~ PCI: loongson: Fix supported link speeds for Loongson 3c19/3c29 PCIe devices proper dynamic speed negotiation. Jun 4, 2025

AydenMeng force-pushed the v6.14.10-rc1 branch from 1313c7e to 55621c2 Compare June 4, 2025 08:46

MingcongBai approved these changes Jun 4, 2025

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MingcongBai merged this pull request into AOSC-Tracking:aosc/v6.14.10-rc1 Jun 4, 2025

KexyBiscuit pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 9, 2025

Merge branches 'ti-k3-dts-next' and 'ti-drivers-soc-next' into ti-next

4ca9c20

Batch #2 of next window Signed-off-by: Nishanth Menon <[email protected]>

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PCI: loongson: Fix supported link speeds for Loongson 3c19/3c29 PCIe devices proper dynamic speed negotiation. #2

PCI: loongson: Fix supported link speeds for Loongson 3c19/3c29 PCIe devices proper dynamic speed negotiation. #2

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PCI: loongson: Fix supported link speeds for Loongson 3c19/3c29 PCIe devices proper dynamic speed negotiation. #2

PCI: loongson: Fix supported link speeds for Loongson 3c19/3c29 PCIe devices proper dynamic speed negotiation. #2

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