diff --git a/crypto/ansi_cprng.c b/crypto/ansi_cprng.c
index eff337ce900370..328abd2c9f7a35 100644
--- a/crypto/ansi_cprng.c
+++ b/crypto/ansi_cprng.c
@@ -1,478 +1 @@
-/*
- * PRNG: Pseudo Random Number Generator
- *       Based on NIST Recommended PRNG From ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 using
- *       AES 128 cipher
- *
- *  (C) Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
- *
- *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- *  under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
- *  Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
- *  any later version.
- *
- *
- */
-
-#include <crypto/internal/rng.h>
-#include <linux/err.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
-#include <linux/string.h>
-
-#define DEFAULT_PRNG_KEY "0123456789abcdef"
-#define DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ 16
-#define DEFAULT_BLK_SZ 16
-#define DEFAULT_V_SEED "zaybxcwdveuftgsh"
-
-/*
- * Flags for the prng_context flags field
- */
-
-#define PRNG_FIXED_SIZE 0x1
-#define PRNG_NEED_RESET 0x2
-
-/*
- * Note: DT is our counter value
- *	 I is our intermediate value
- *	 V is our seed vector
- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/rng/931rngext.pdf
- * for implementation details
- */
-
-
-struct prng_context {
-	spinlock_t prng_lock;
-	unsigned char rand_data[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
-	unsigned char last_rand_data[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
-	unsigned char DT[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
-	unsigned char I[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
-	unsigned char V[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
-	u32 rand_data_valid;
-	struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
-	u32 flags;
-};
-
-static int dbg;
-
-static void hexdump(char *note, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
-{
-	if (dbg) {
-		printk(KERN_CRIT "%s", note);
-		print_hex_dump(KERN_CONT, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET,
-				16, 1,
-				buf, len, false);
-	}
-}
-
-#define dbgprint(format, args...) do {\
-if (dbg)\
-	printk(format, ##args);\
-} while (0)
-
-static void xor_vectors(unsigned char *in1, unsigned char *in2,
-			unsigned char *out, unsigned int size)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
-		out[i] = in1[i] ^ in2[i];
-
-}
-/*
- * Returns DEFAULT_BLK_SZ bytes of random data per call
- * returns 0 if generation succeeded, <0 if something went wrong
- */
-static int _get_more_prng_bytes(struct prng_context *ctx, int cont_test)
-{
-	int i;
-	unsigned char tmp[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
-	unsigned char *output = NULL;
-
-
-	dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "Calling _get_more_prng_bytes for context %p\n",
-		ctx);
-
-	hexdump("Input DT: ", ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-	hexdump("Input I: ", ctx->I, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-	hexdump("Input V: ", ctx->V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-
-	/*
-	 * This algorithm is a 3 stage state machine
-	 */
-	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
-
-		switch (i) {
-		case 0:
-			/*
-			 * Start by encrypting the counter value
-			 * This gives us an intermediate value I
-			 */
-			memcpy(tmp, ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-			output = ctx->I;
-			hexdump("tmp stage 0: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-			break;
-		case 1:
-
-			/*
-			 * Next xor I with our secret vector V
-			 * encrypt that result to obtain our
-			 * pseudo random data which we output
-			 */
-			xor_vectors(ctx->I, ctx->V, tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-			hexdump("tmp stage 1: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-			output = ctx->rand_data;
-			break;
-		case 2:
-			/*
-			 * First check that we didn't produce the same
-			 * random data that we did last time around through this
-			 */
-			if (!memcmp(ctx->rand_data, ctx->last_rand_data,
-					DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)) {
-				if (cont_test) {
-					panic("cprng %p Failed repetition check!\n",
-						ctx);
-				}
-
-				printk(KERN_ERR
-					"ctx %p Failed repetition check!\n",
-					ctx);
-
-				ctx->flags |= PRNG_NEED_RESET;
-				return -EINVAL;
-			}
-			memcpy(ctx->last_rand_data, ctx->rand_data,
-				DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-
-			/*
-			 * Lastly xor the random data with I
-			 * and encrypt that to obtain a new secret vector V
-			 */
-			xor_vectors(ctx->rand_data, ctx->I, tmp,
-				DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-			output = ctx->V;
-			hexdump("tmp stage 2: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-			break;
-		}
-
-
-		/* do the encryption */
-		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->tfm, output, tmp);
-
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Now update our DT value
-	 */
-	for (i = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-		ctx->DT[i] += 1;
-		if (ctx->DT[i] != 0)
-			break;
-	}
-
-	dbgprint("Returning new block for context %p\n", ctx);
-	ctx->rand_data_valid = 0;
-
-	hexdump("Output DT: ", ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-	hexdump("Output I: ", ctx->I, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-	hexdump("Output V: ", ctx->V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-	hexdump("New Random Data: ", ctx->rand_data, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* Our exported functions */
-static int get_prng_bytes(char *buf, size_t nbytes, struct prng_context *ctx,
-				int do_cont_test)
-{
-	unsigned char *ptr = buf;
-	unsigned int byte_count = (unsigned int)nbytes;
-	int err;
-
-
-	spin_lock_bh(&ctx->prng_lock);
-
-	err = -EINVAL;
-	if (ctx->flags & PRNG_NEED_RESET)
-		goto done;
-
-	/*
-	 * If the FIXED_SIZE flag is on, only return whole blocks of
-	 * pseudo random data
-	 */
-	err = -EINVAL;
-	if (ctx->flags & PRNG_FIXED_SIZE) {
-		if (nbytes < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)
-			goto done;
-		byte_count = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Return 0 in case of success as mandated by the kernel
-	 * crypto API interface definition.
-	 */
-	err = 0;
-
-	dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "getting %d random bytes for context %p\n",
-		byte_count, ctx);
-
-
-remainder:
-	if (ctx->rand_data_valid == DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
-		if (_get_more_prng_bytes(ctx, do_cont_test) < 0) {
-			memset(buf, 0, nbytes);
-			err = -EINVAL;
-			goto done;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Copy any data less than an entire block
-	 */
-	if (byte_count < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
-empty_rbuf:
-		while (ctx->rand_data_valid < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
-			*ptr = ctx->rand_data[ctx->rand_data_valid];
-			ptr++;
-			byte_count--;
-			ctx->rand_data_valid++;
-			if (byte_count == 0)
-				goto done;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Now copy whole blocks
-	 */
-	for (; byte_count >= DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; byte_count -= DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
-		if (ctx->rand_data_valid == DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
-			if (_get_more_prng_bytes(ctx, do_cont_test) < 0) {
-				memset(buf, 0, nbytes);
-				err = -EINVAL;
-				goto done;
-			}
-		}
-		if (ctx->rand_data_valid > 0)
-			goto empty_rbuf;
-		memcpy(ptr, ctx->rand_data, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-		ctx->rand_data_valid += DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
-		ptr += DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Now go back and get any remaining partial block
-	 */
-	if (byte_count)
-		goto remainder;
-
-done:
-	spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->prng_lock);
-	dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "returning %d from get_prng_bytes in context %p\n",
-		err, ctx);
-	return err;
-}
-
-static void free_prng_context(struct prng_context *ctx)
-{
-	crypto_free_cipher(ctx->tfm);
-}
-
-static int reset_prng_context(struct prng_context *ctx,
-			      const unsigned char *key, size_t klen,
-			      const unsigned char *V, const unsigned char *DT)
-{
-	int ret;
-	const unsigned char *prng_key;
-
-	spin_lock_bh(&ctx->prng_lock);
-	ctx->flags |= PRNG_NEED_RESET;
-
-	prng_key = (key != NULL) ? key : (unsigned char *)DEFAULT_PRNG_KEY;
-
-	if (!key)
-		klen = DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ;
-
-	if (V)
-		memcpy(ctx->V, V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-	else
-		memcpy(ctx->V, DEFAULT_V_SEED, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-
-	if (DT)
-		memcpy(ctx->DT, DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-	else
-		memset(ctx->DT, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-
-	memset(ctx->rand_data, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-	memset(ctx->last_rand_data, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
-
-	ctx->rand_data_valid = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
-
-	ret = crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->tfm, prng_key, klen);
-	if (ret) {
-		dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "PRNG: setkey() failed flags=%x\n",
-			crypto_cipher_get_flags(ctx->tfm));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	ret = 0;
-	ctx->flags &= ~PRNG_NEED_RESET;
-out:
-	spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->prng_lock);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int cprng_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
-{
-	struct prng_context *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
-
-	spin_lock_init(&ctx->prng_lock);
-	ctx->tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(ctx->tfm)) {
-		dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "Failed to alloc tfm for context %p\n",
-				ctx);
-		return PTR_ERR(ctx->tfm);
-	}
-
-	if (reset_prng_context(ctx, NULL, DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ, NULL, NULL) < 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	/*
-	 * after allocation, we should always force the user to reset
-	 * so they don't inadvertently use the insecure default values
-	 * without specifying them intentially
-	 */
-	ctx->flags |= PRNG_NEED_RESET;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cprng_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
-{
-	free_prng_context(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm));
-}
-
-static int cprng_get_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
-			    const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
-			    u8 *rdata, unsigned int dlen)
-{
-	struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
-
-	return get_prng_bytes(rdata, dlen, prng, 0);
-}
-
-/*
- *  This is the cprng_registered reset method the seed value is
- *  interpreted as the tuple { V KEY DT}
- *  V and KEY are required during reset, and DT is optional, detected
- *  as being present by testing the length of the seed
- */
-static int cprng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
-		       const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
-{
-	struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
-	const u8 *key = seed + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
-	const u8 *dt = NULL;
-
-	if (slen < DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (slen >= (2 * DEFAULT_BLK_SZ + DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ))
-		dt = key + DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ;
-
-	reset_prng_context(prng, key, DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ, seed, dt);
-
-	if (prng->flags & PRNG_NEED_RESET)
-		return -EINVAL;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
-static int fips_cprng_get_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
-				 const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
-				 u8 *rdata, unsigned int dlen)
-{
-	struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
-
-	return get_prng_bytes(rdata, dlen, prng, 1);
-}
-
-static int fips_cprng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
-			    const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
-{
-	u8 rdata[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
-	const u8 *key = seed + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
-	int rc;
-
-	struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
-
-	if (slen < DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	/* fips strictly requires seed != key */
-	if (!memcmp(seed, key, DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	rc = cprng_reset(tfm, seed, slen);
-
-	if (!rc)
-		goto out;
-
-	/* this primes our continuity test */
-	rc = get_prng_bytes(rdata, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ, prng, 0);
-	prng->rand_data_valid = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
-
-out:
-	return rc;
-}
-#endif
-
-static struct rng_alg rng_algs[] = { {
-	.generate		= cprng_get_random,
-	.seed			= cprng_reset,
-	.seedsize		= DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + 2 * DEFAULT_BLK_SZ,
-	.base			=	{
-		.cra_name		= "stdrng",
-		.cra_driver_name	= "ansi_cprng",
-		.cra_priority		= 100,
-		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct prng_context),
-		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
-		.cra_init		= cprng_init,
-		.cra_exit		= cprng_exit,
-	}
-#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
-}, {
-	.generate		= fips_cprng_get_random,
-	.seed			= fips_cprng_reset,
-	.seedsize		= DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + 2 * DEFAULT_BLK_SZ,
-	.base			=	{
-		.cra_name		= "fips(ansi_cprng)",
-		.cra_driver_name	= "fips_ansi_cprng",
-		.cra_priority		= 300,
-		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct prng_context),
-		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
-		.cra_init		= cprng_init,
-		.cra_exit		= cprng_exit,
-	}
-#endif
-} };
-
-/* Module initalization */
-static int __init prng_mod_init(void)
-{
-	return crypto_register_rngs(rng_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(rng_algs));
-}
-
-static void __exit prng_mod_fini(void)
-{
-	crypto_unregister_rngs(rng_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(rng_algs));
-}
-
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Software Pseudo Random Number Generator");
-MODULE_AUTHOR("Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>");
-module_param(dbg, int, 0);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(dbg, "Boolean to enable debugging (0/1 == off/on)");
-module_init(prng_mod_init);
-module_exit(prng_mod_fini);
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("stdrng");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ansi_cprng");
+//lolno